Where Is Home? The Challenge of Finding Safe Housing Via Early Lease Termination for Victims of Domestic Violence by Gerchick, Charlotte
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 
Volume 26 Issue 1 Article 8 
1-10-2020 
Where Is Home? The Challenge of Finding Safe Housing Via Early 
Lease Termination for Victims of Domestic Violence 
Charlotte Gerchick 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, gerchick.c@law.wlu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Family Law Commons, Housing Law Commons, 
Human Rights Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charlotte Gerchick, Where Is Home? The Challenge of Finding Safe Housing Via Early Lease Termination 
for Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 279 (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol26/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social 
Justice at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
279 
Where Is Home? The Challenge of 
Finding Safe Housing Via Early Lease 
Termination for Victims of Domestic 
Violence 
Charlotte Gerchick* 
Abstract 
This Note addresses the legal recourse of domestic violence 
victims who are attempting to terminate a lease early for the 
purpose of escaping domestic violence at home. In March 2013, 
President Barack Obama signed the reauthorization of the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA). This version of the Act includes Title 
VI, which protects victims of domestic violence and stalking. Title 
VI applies to federally subsidized housing. It allows domestic 
violence victims to terminate a lease early for the purpose of 
removing themselves from an abusive household. Title VI also 
makes it illegal to deny or terminate housing assistance based on 
an individual’s status as a victim of domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault, or stalking. Even with federal legislation 
in place, domestic violence victims in nearly half of the United 
States cannot terminate leases early for the purpose of escaping 
abuse because their leases are private and therefore not subject to 
the federal law. In response to this barrier, some states are enacting 
laws that allow victims to terminate their private leases early. The 
various state statutes are inconsistent with one another, however. 
Therefore, some statutes protect victims more thoroughly than 
others. The inconsistencies may confuse individuals about what 
protections various statutes actually offer. This Note includes a 
model universal statute that addresses gaps in victim protection 
and clarifies which rights victimized tenants should have. 
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I. Introduction 
A. The Case of Caren Burnett 
On June 3, 2010, Mrs. Caren Burnett filed a petition in Florida 
for a domestic violence civil protection order (CPO) against her 
husband, Mr. Alan Burnett.1 The purpose of the CPO was to 
protect Mrs. Burnett and her three minor children from Mr. 
Burnett.2 During the process of filing a petition to receive the CPO, 
Mrs. Burnett alleged that for seven years her husband repeatedly 
threatened to kill her in a variety of ways.3 After briefly detailing 
the threats to a judge and affirming she was in fear for her safety 
and well-being, the court granted Mrs. Burnett a temporary ex 
parte CPO.4 Additionally, the court assigned a future court date at 
which Mrs. Burnett and her husband could address the allegations 
in a fully adjudicated hearing, potentially extending the lifetime of 
the CPO for up to a year.5 
During the hearing, Mrs. Burnett testified about Mr. Burnett’s 
infliction of emotional abuse, noting that incidences of abuse 
occurred in Florida, Ohio, and Michigan.6 Mrs. Burnett testified 
that her husband had devised a “wood-chipper” plan, “indicating 
that he could shoot a wood-chipper’s contents into a lake and then 
dump bleach into it to get rid of the evidence.”7 The implication 
was that the “contents” would be Mrs. Burnett’s remains.8 In 
addition to specific murder plans, Mr. Burnett also made more 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
15, 2012) (“On June 3, 2010, appellee filed a petition for a domestic violence CPO 
in the court below, pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.”). 
 2. See id. (“Through the petition, appellee sought protection for herself and 
the three children.”). 
 3. See id. (“She alleged that over the course of seven years, appellant had 
threatened her with death by means of a handgun or wood chipper if she ever left 
him.”). 
 4. See id. (“Following an ex parte hearing on the same day, the lower court 
issued an ex parte domestic violence CPO, naming appellee and the parties’ three 
minor children as protected persons.”). 
 5. See id. (“The court further ordered that the case proceed to a full hearing 
before the lower court magistrate.”). 
 6. See id. (describing Mr. Burnett’s interest in handguns while in Florida 
and, later, threats to kill Mrs. Burnett in Ohio and Michigan). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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generalized death threats toward Mrs. Burnett involving their 
children.9 
In an attempt to escape her husband’s abuse, Mrs. Burnett 
took a risk and strategically removed her children from the home.10 
Mrs. Burnett moved to Ohio without Mr. Burnett’s knowledge.11 
Mr. Burnett thought Mrs. Burnett planned to live in Florida with 
him because they had signed a lease together.12 However, Mrs. 
Burnett actually intended to leave her husband.13 She signed the 
lease out of fear of her husband’s retaliation if he knew she wanted 
to leave.14 Mrs. Burnett testified that “on the same day [she and 
her husband signed a lease], outside the presence of [her husband], 
she initialed a document pertaining to the termination of the lease; 
she also secured a storage unit and . . . shipped back all of her 
materials for her business.”15 While planning the move to Ohio, 
Mrs. Burnett contacted an Ohio legal aid office to help her find a 
way to get out of her lease in Florida, find a new place to live in 
Ohio, and find schools and doctors for her children.16 After 
considering all of the evidence, the trial court concluded Mrs. 
Burnett and her children should be granted a permanent domestic 
violence CPO, providing them with protection from Mr. Burnett for 
a full year.17 Mrs. Burnett was able to leave her husband and move 
                                                                                                     
 9. See id. (quoting her husband as saying, “If you leave me, I’ll kill you and 
then I’ll go to jail and the kids will have to stay with my parents”). 
 10. See id. (detailing how Mrs. Burnett tried to leave her husband without 
his knowledge). 
 11. See id. (“[Mrs. Burnett] admitted that she went to Florida with [Mr. 
Burnett] but that she never intended to remain there. She went because appellant 
took their oldest two children in the moving van with him.”). 
 12. See id. (describing Mrs. Burnett’s experience). 
 13. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-12-041, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 
22, 2013) (revealing via testimony exactly how Mrs. Burnett tried to escape the 
abuse). 
 14. See id. (noting why Mrs. Burnett signed a lease with her husband). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (“[Mrs. Burnett] testified that while in Florida, she made several 
calls to an Ohio legal aid office. [She] also stated that during that time she was 
making calls to set up where she and the boys would live, and making inquiries 
as to schools, dentists, and doctors.”). 
 17. See id. (“Accordingly, the [trial] court issued a full civil protection order 
against appellant for a period of one year. In that order, the court named [Mrs. 
Burnett] and [her] three children as protected persons.”). 
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to Ohio.18 While Mr. Burnett continued to harass Mrs. Burnett by 
including her name in legal proceedings for various claims, she was 
at least able to successfully terminate the lease and move to a safer 
place with her children.19 She was fortunate.  
Mrs. Burnett’s story—a woman with children trying to leave 
an abusive husband—exemplifies the experience of thousands of 
women and children in the United States.20 In fact, one in four 
women will be a victim of severe domestic violence by a partner in 
her lifetime.21 When leaving her husband to protect her children, 
Mrs. Burnett was burdened by the need to leave an existing home 
and find a new one.22 Housing is a major concern of those who try 
to escape domestic violence.23 The existing law does not make the 
process of leaving easy, resulting in a high likelihood of 
homelessness.24 
Several states have begun to legally address the difficulty 
many domestic violence victims face when trying to escape an 
abuser with whom they live.25 Some states have adopted statutory 
provisions that allow victims to terminate their leases early 
                                                                                                     
 18. See id. (sharing that Mrs. Burnett was able to leave Florida). 
 19. See id. (addressing other cases the Burnetts were involved in). 
 20. See Alanna Vagianos, 30 Shocking Domestic Violence Statistics that 
Remind Us It’s an Epidemic, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/23/domestic-violence-
statistics_n_5959776.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (noting that ten million 
children are exposed to domestic violence every year) [https://perma.cc/U3NB-
WF9X]. 
 21. See id. (sharing statistics from 2017). 
 22. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 
22, 2013) (addressing the ways Mrs. Burnett tried to remove herself and her 
children from Mr. Burnett’s abuse). 
 23. See Vagianos, supra note 20 (addressing the prevalence of homelessness 
among victims of domestic violence). 
 24. See Domestic Violence and Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END 
HOMELESSNESS, https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/what-
causes-homelessness/domestic-violence/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“On a single 
night in 2017, homeless services providers had more than 55,000 beds set aside 
for survivors of domestic violence.”) [https://perma.cc/4VHS-ZQ84]. 
 25. See State Laws Protecting Tenants in Domestic Violence Situations, 
NOLO (Nov. 2017), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-laws-
protecting-tenants-in-domestic-violence-situations.html (last visited Nov. 28, 
2019) [hereinafter State Laws] (identifying states having early lease termination 
statutes for domestic violence victims) [https://perma.cc/HC66-HZR7]. 
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without penalty of consequence or discrimination when attempting 
to find a new home.26  
Had Mrs. Burnett lived in Georgia, for example, she could 
have provided notice to her landlord that she needed to terminate 
her lease early, provided a police report and an ex parte temporary 
CPO, and then would have been able to terminate the lease 
without consequence.27 Many states do not allow early lease 
termination with only an ex parte temporary CPO, however, and 
require a copy of a permanent CPO to terminate a lease early.28 
As another example, in Colorado, in addition to the ability to 
terminate a lease early, Mrs. Burnett would have been able to 
receive a referral letter from her former landlord whose lease she 
had terminated without fearing discrimination by a new landlord 
due to her status as a victim or fearing that her previous landlord 
could disclose her status.29 Mrs. Burnett was lucky, but other 
victims continue to suffer, as neither Ohio nor Florida have any 
state statutes permitting early lease termination for domestic 
violence victims.30 
In Mrs. Burnett’s case, all she could do was hope the Florida 
landlord would release her from the existing lease without 
consequence and hope to receive a new lease in Ohio without the 
Florida landlord disclosing why she left or warning against her as 
a tenant.31 Sadly, many women in the United States are 
unsuccessful when attempting to escape domestic violence.32 Many 
                                                                                                     
 26. See id. (noting the different provisions that states have). 
 27. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (“The notice to the landlord pursuant 
to subsection (b) of this Code section shall be accompanied by a copy of the 
applicable civil family violence order or criminal family violence order and a copy 
of the police report if such order was an ex parte temporary protective order.”). 
 28. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (noting that a domestic 
violence victim may terminate a lease early with “a certified copy of a permanent 
restraining order”). 
 29. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (clarifying that when 
a domestic violence victim terminates a lease early the “landlord shall not disclose 
such fact to any person except with the consent of the victim”). 
 30. See State Laws, supra note 25 (indicating that neither state has statutes 
regarding early lease termination for domestic violence victims). 
 31. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 
22, 2013) (describing how Mrs. Burnett made arrangements to move to Ohio on 
the same day that she signed the lease in Florida). 
 32. See Vagianos, supra note 20 (noting that 18,000 women have been killed 
by men because of domestic violence since 2003). 
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are hindered in their efforts to leave because landlords reject early 
lease termination efforts, discriminate against victims, or apply 
various penalties to those who abandon existing leases.33 
This Note addresses the legal tools available to victims of 
domestic violence when they wish to terminate a lease early in an 
effort to escape an abuser.34 This Note also considers why the tools 
currently available are insufficient to protect victims.35 
B.  Domestic Violence in America 
1.  Definitions and Forms of Abuse 
“Domestic violence—also called intimate partner violence, 
domestic abuse or relationship abuse—is a pattern of behaviors 
executed by one partner to maintain power and control over 
another partner in an intimate relationship.”36 Potentially, anyone 
could become a victim of domestic violence because it affects all 
genders, races, sexual orientations, socio-economic groups, and 
ages.37 It is a common misconception that victims of domestic 
violence only suffer physical abuse.38 While physical abuse is one 
                                                                                                     
 33. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677 (D. Vt. 2005) 
(demonstrating discriminatory actions by a landlord due to the tenant’s status as 
a domestic abuse victim);  see also Knudsen v. Lax, 842 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Cty. 
Ct. 2007) (penalizing a tenant who terminated his lease in order to move away 
and protect his kids from a sex offender by withholding his security deposit); 
Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 1:08-CV-238, 2008 WL 1924255, 
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008) (refusing to transfer a victim of domestic violence 
to another vacant unit in the complex so that she could escape her abuser). 
 34. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (noting that a domestic 
violence victim may terminate a lease early with “a certified copy of a permanent 
restraining order”). 
 35. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (providing protection from housing discrimination for female victims 
of domestic violence, but only for federally subsidized housing). 
 36. Abuse Defined, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, 
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/abuse-defined/ (last visited Nov. 28, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/MAZ7-G72S]. 
 37. See id. (“Domestic violence does not discriminate. Anyone of any race, 
age, sexual orientation, religion or gender can be a victim—or perpetrator—of 
domestic violence. It can happen to people who are married, living together or 
who are dating. It affects people of all socioeconomic backgrounds and education 
levels.”). 
 38. See id. (detailing the various types of abuse). 
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form of domestic violence, psychological and emotional abuse are 
also types of domestic violence.39 Often domestic violence begins as 
psychological or emotional abuse but later escalates to physical 
violence.40 
Those who commit domestic violence do so to control their 
partner, often due to their own insecurity.41 “Abusive people 
believe they have the right to control and restrict their 
partners . . . . They often believe that their own feelings and needs 
should be the priority in their relationships.”42 
There are various methods of abuse.43 Physical abuse can 
include slapping, hitting with a closed fist, strangulation, and 
physical restraint.44 Sexual violence is another form of physical 
domestic violence.45 Emotional and psychological abuse typically 
include “yelling, name-calling, blaming, and shaming,” and 
threatening the victim with physical violence or death, as well as 
efforts to isolate the victim from others.46 
With the development of new technology, abusers have 
discovered how to use devices and social media to perpetuate 
abuse.47 As social media has gained popularity, perpetrators of 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. (“Domestic violence includes behaviors that physically harm, 
arouse fear, prevent a partner from doing what they wish or force them to behave 
in ways they do not want. It includes the use of physical and sexual violence, 
threats and intimidation, emotional abuse and economic deprivation.”). 
 40. See Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse, 
HELPGUIDE.ORG (Sept. 2018), https://www.helpguide.org/articles/abuse/domestic-
violence-and-abuse.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“Domestic abuse often 
escalates from threats and verbal abuse to violence.”) [https://perma.cc/429B-
LTF2]. 
 41. See Why Do People Abuse?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, 
https://www.thehotline.org/is-this-abuse/why-do-people-abuse/ (last visited Nov. 
28, 2019) (“Domestic violence and abuse stem from a desire to gain and maintain 
power and control over an intimate partner.”) [https://perma.cc/7HK3-36CG]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Smith & Segal, supra note 40 (explaining that there is physical, 
emotional, and psychological abuse). 
 44. See Smith & Segal, supra note 40 (“Physical abuse is the use of physical 
force against someone in a way that injures or endangers that person. Physical 
assault or battering is a crime, whether it occurs inside or outside of the family.”). 
 45. See Smith & Segal, supra note 40 (“Any situation in which you are forced 
to participate in unwanted, unsafe, or degrading sexual activity is sexual abuse.”). 
 46. Smith & Segal, supra note 40. 
 47. See Delanie Woodlock, The Abuse of Technology in Domestic Violence and 
Stalking, 23 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 584, 584 (2017) (“[T]echnology—including 
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domestic violence have begun to use various platforms to commit 
abuse.48 For example, a perpetrator might post nude pictures of the 
victim online in an effort to publicly shame the victim, harass a 
victim’s friends and family on social media in an effort to gain the 
victim’s attention, and publish derogatory messages about the 
victim for the public to read.49 With the development of 
smartphone applications and smart home devices, abusers have 
been able to modernize their tactics further.50 For example, several 
applications allow abusers to disguise their phone numbers, 
allowing them to contact their victims from different numbers once 
the victims have blocked their contact number.51 Additionally, this 
allows perpetrators to remain anonymous, making it difficult for a 
victim to convince a judge that the same person is calling from a 
variety of numbers.52 Smart home applications have recently been 
recognized as helping perpetrators abuse their victims.53 “[A]ir 
                                                                                                     
phones, tablets, computers, and social networking websites—is commonly used in 
intimate partner stalking.”). 
 48. See Interview with Domestic Violence Victim One, Client, Atlanta 
Volunteer Lawyers Found., in Atlanta, Ga. (July 19, 2018) (explaining how her 
abuser would harass her on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram by pestering her 
friends and family so they would contact the victim on the perpetrator’s behalf);  
see also Tech & Social Media Safety, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, 
https://www.thehotline.org/help/tech-social-media-safety/ (last visited Nov. 28, 
2019) (detailing how perpetrators of domestic violence utilize social media) 
[https://perma.cc/Y44Z-Y54E]. 
 49. See Interview with Domestic Violence Victim One, supra note 48 
(describing the various social media methods in which the perpetrator would 
abuse the victim). 
 50. See Interview with Domestic Violence Victim Two, Client, Atlanta 
Volunteer Lawyers Found., in Atlanta, Ga. (July 3, 2018) (explaining how her 
abuser would use spoof apps to repeatedly change his phone number each time 
she blocked him);  see also Caller ID Spoofing 101:  The Definitive Guide to Call 
& Text Spoofing, SPOOFCARD (Nov. 30, 2017), 
https://www.spoofcard.com/blog/caller-id-spoofing/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) 
[hereinafter Caller ID Spoofing 101] (explaining how the spoof app works) 
[https://perma.cc/RP9B-38LT]. 
 51. See Caller ID Spoofing 101, supra note 50 (“Caller ID spoofing services 
. . . give you the power to communicate anonymously when you otherwise could 
not.”). 
 52. See Interview with Joel Correa, Staff Attorney, Atlanta Volunteer 
Lawyers Found., in Atlanta, Ga. (July 20, 2018) (explaining how the law has yet 
to catch up with advancements in technology). 
 53. See Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights:  Digital Tools of 
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2018, at A1 (identifying the various ways 
abusers have used technology to target victims). 
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conditioners, doorbells, and so many other household items are 
able to be controlled remotely, making them prime targets for 
driving a partner crazy—or at least making them feel that way.”54 
For example, one victim described “thermostats suddenly turning 
themselves up to 100 degrees or smart speakers suddenly blasting 
music.”55 These are all methods to control and exert power over a 
victim.56 
2.  Domestic Violence Today 
Millions of individuals in the United States qualify for a 
protective order.57 “1 in 3 women and 1 in 4 men have been victims 
of [some form of] physical violence by an intimate partner within 
their lifetime.”58 While both men and women are victims of 
domestic violence, statistics reveal that more women than men are 
victimized.59 “The number of American women who were murdered 
by current or ex male partners [between 2001 and 2012] was 
11,766.60 That is nearly double the number of American casualties 
lost during [the War on Terror].”61 Indeed, 6488 American troops 
were killed in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2001 and 2012.62 
                                                                                                     
 54. Wendy L. Patrick, Remote Controlled:  Domestic Abuse Through 
Technology, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 22, 2018), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-bad-looks-good/201807/remote-
controlled-domestic-abuse-through-technology?amp (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/4D3W-CZCU]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. (“Abusive relationships are about power and control, and [the 
abuser] uses technology.”). 
 57. See Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
https://ncadv.org/statistics (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“On average, nearly 20 
people per minute are physically abused by an intimate partner in the United 
States. During one year, this equates to more than 10 million women and men.”) 
[https://perma.cc/Y7RW-9R45]. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. (“Women are much more likely to be victims of intimate partner 
violence with 85 percent of domestic abuse victims being women and 15 percent 
men.”). 
 60. Vagianos, supra note 20. 
 61. Vagianos, supra note 20. 
 62. Vagianos, supra note 20. 
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With such a high number of domestic violence victims in 
America, many victims try to avoid becoming a murder statistic by 
moving away from their abusers.63 Removing oneself from an 
abusive situation is not always simple because many victims 
cannot financially afford to leave, do not want to live in a shelter 
with their children, or do not know of a safe place to go.64 “Domestic 
and sexual violence is a primary cause, and consequence, of 
homelessness and housing instability for women and girls.”65 Many 
women who are abused by an intimate partner are financially 
unstable but feel that their lives are so at risk that they must leave, 
many times becoming homeless.66 Housing often becomes a major 
concern of those who suffer domestic violence because many 
victims who decide to move away from their abuser must face the 
challenges of finding new housing and leaving their current 
home.67 
Victims endure discriminatory challenges from various 
sources when trying to establish safe homes.68 Often landlords 
evict victims who create disturbances during the abuse or deny 
                                                                                                     
 63. See Melissa Davey, The Most Dangerous Time, THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/ng-interactive/2015/jun/02/domestic-
violence-five-women-tell-their-stories-of-leaving-the-most-dangerous-time (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (detailing the various ways and reasons why women have 
worked to escape domestically violent situations) [https://perma.cc/LAR9-4F23]. 
 64. See Susan Johnson Taylor, 5 Financial Challenges Facing Survivors of 
Domestic Abuse, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 26, 2018, 10:24 AM), 
https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2016-10-26/5-
financial-challenges-facing-survivors-of-domestic-abuse (last visited Nov. 28, 
2019) (explaining the financial difficulty regarding housing when victims try to 
leave a domestically violent situation) [https://perma.cc/3Z7F-CB7Y]. 
 65. See A General Overview of Disparate Impact Theory:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113 Cong. 
1 (2013) (reporting that nearly a fifth of cities surveyed in 2011 cited domestic 
violence as one of the three main causes of family homelessness). 
 66. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12471 (2012) (finding that an estimated ninety-two 
percent of homeless mothers have experienced severe physical and/or sexual 
assault, that sixty percent of all homeless women and children have been abused 
by age twelve, and that sixty-three percent have been victims of intimate partner 
violence as adults). 
 67. See Taylor, supra note 64 (detailing the financial challenges that 
domestic violence victims face). 
 68. See Brief for ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 21, 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371), 2014 WL 7405733 (“Discriminatory housing 
policies contribute to and exacerbate the housing crisis faced by victims.”). 
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housing to anyone who is a victim of domestic violence.69 On the 
other hand, landlords often refuse to allow domestic violence 
victims to terminate their leases, which forces the victim to remain 
in violent circumstances they are trying to escape.70 
3.  Different Punishments for Different Forms of Abuse 
The law has been slow to provide housing recourse for victims 
but the law has succeeded in establishing different punishments 
for different types of abuse.71 Victims of domestic violence fall into 
distinct legal categories under the larger umbrella of domestic 
violence based on the type of relationship they have with the 
perpetrator and the type of abuse they endure.72 While the specific 
characteristics of each category differ slightly in each state, 
generally there are uniform definitions for those who suffer 
intimate partner violence versus stalking.73 
In Georgia, for example, intimate partner violence is 
categorized as “family violence,” requiring a close personal 
                                                                                                     
 69. See EQUAL RIGHTS CTR., NO VACANCY:  HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (2008) 
(“Domestic . . . violence survivors are also frequently subjected to discrimination 
when they apply for housing, simply because they have experienced violence. This 
can occur when . . . their past history of victimization may become known to 
landlords because they are applying for housing while residing in . . . emergency 
shelters.”). 
 70. See Anne C. Johnson, From House to Home:  Creating a Right to Early 
Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 1866 
(2006) (“Once victims make the difficult decision to leave their abusers, those who 
occupy rental housing face the challenge of avoiding fees related to early lease 
termination.”). 
 71. See Violence Prevention, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/index.html (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (noting the different types of abuse and the various 
punishments) [https://perma.cc/W2YH-4WCG]. 
 72. See id. (explaining the differences of the categories of domestic violence). 
 73. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, FINDLAW, 
https://statelaws.findlaw.com/georgia-law/georgia-domestic-violence-laws.html 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (noting the differences between intimate partner 
violence and stalking according to Georgia law) [https://perma.cc/M75P-BP35];  
see also Intimate Partner Violence, NAT’L INSTIT. OF JUST. (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/intimate-partner-violence/Pages/welcome.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (explaining what constitutes different types of 
domestic violence) [https://perma.cc/3Z3X-SRGK]. 
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relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.74 These types 
of relationships include “present or past spouses, parents of the 
same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, 
foster parents and foster children, or other persons living or 
formerly living in the same household.”75 Victims of intimate 
partner violence are protected under the state’s Family Violence 
Act, which affords victims the opportunity for legal remedies if 
they suffer abuse, such as obtaining a detailed protective order.76 
Protective orders “prohibit[] the offender from having contact with 
the victim for a specified period of time.77 If a person is found to 
violate a . . . protective order, he or she could be jailed and charged 
with a separate crime, including aggravated stalking,” which is a 
felony.78 The intimate partner protective orders are extensive, 
allowing a court to provide a victim with a variety of legal 
remedies.79 While these orders are intended to keep perpetrators 
away from victims, they have been ineffective in helping victims 
terminate their leases early for the purpose of escaping abuse—
that is, until the Georgia legislature specifically enacted an early 
lease termination statute.80 
Stalking laws work to protect those who suffer domestic 
violence but do not fall under the category of intimate partner 
violence.81 The categorization of stalking is relatively new, gaining 
legal prominence over the past ten years.82 Those who experience 
stalking suffer physical, emotional, and psychological abuse but do 
                                                                                                     
 74. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73 (“The state of Georgia 
defines domestic violence as an act of ‘family violence.’”). 
 75. Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73. 
 76. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73 (“Georgia’s Family 
Violence Act is a law designed to protect individuals who are abused . . . .”). 
 77. Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73. 
 78. Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73. 
 79. See Georgia Domestic Violence Laws, supra note 73 (“A Family Violence 
Protection Order can: . . . [g]ive the victim possession of the house . . . [m]ake the 
abuser provide alternate housing . . . [g]ive the victim temporary custody of 
shared children . . . [a]ward temporary child support and/or spousal support . . . 
[o]rder the abuser to go to counseling . . . .”). 
 80. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (detailing how a protective order can 
help a victim terminate a lease early). 
 81. See id. (explaining what constitutes stalking). 
 82. See Stalking, FINDLAW, https://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-
charges/stalking.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“In most states, stalking laws 
pertain to the relatively new crime . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/Y6LR-LJV9]. 
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not have a legally acknowledged “intimate” relationship with the 
abuser.83 For example, the stalking statute in Georgia would 
protect individuals who date or dated, but never lived with or had 
a child with the perpetrator.84 “By its nature, stalking is not a 
one-time event but rather a pattern of behavior meant to cause 
harm or distress.”85 One can file for a stalking protective order but, 
to have a judge grant the order, the victim must demonstrate that 
there have been repeated acts of abuse or harassment.86 A stalking 
protective order is less extensive than a Family Violence Protective 
Order because the former typically only requires the accused “to 
remain a certain distance away from the alleged victim [and not 
contact that person] for a specified period of time,” while a Family 
Violence Protective Order can award damages, asset protection, 
and other financial benefits for the victim.87 Penalties for violating 
either type of protective order can be “quite severe, including jail 
time in some states.”88 
4.  The Process:  How to Get a Protective Order 
Continuing to use Georgia as an example, to obtain a 
protective order, one must first file for an emergency ex parte 
temporary order that would provide protection for the victim for 
up to thirty days.89 A victim fills out both a petition and the actual 
ex parte order by writing a brief description of the abuse that has 
occurred, first noting the most recent incident that drove the victim 
                                                                                                     
 83. See id. (explaining that stalking “involve[s] a clear pattern of conduct in 
which the offender follows, harasses, or threatens another person, putting that 
person in fear for his or her safety”). 
 84. See id. (“An individual may be charged with stalking regardless of any 
pre-existing relationship with the victim.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. (“It includes repeated harassing or threatening behavior toward 
another person, whether that person is a total stranger, slight acquaintance, 
current or former intimate partner, or anyone else.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how a victim 
of domestic violence files for a protective order);  see also Victim’s Rights, 
FULTONCOUNTYGA.GOV, http://www.fultoncountyga.gov/sg-victims-rights (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (detailing the process of how one receives a protective order 
in Georgia) [https://perma.cc/GK7M-HEJE].  
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to seek an order.90 Once the appropriate forms are completed, the 
petitioner sees a judge who can grant the emergency ex parte order 
the same day.91 The judge can also assign a future court date that 
falls within those protected thirty days, at which the respondent 
can be present and plead his or her case and present evidence.92 At 
that hearing the judge can extend the protective order for up to 
three years, making it a permanent protective order, or can 
dismiss the matter.93 If the order is dismissed, the petitioner can 
always refile if other incidents of abuse occur.94 During the ex parte 
hearing the judge could also deny the order without an appeal or 
could deny the emergency temporary order but still provide a date 
for a fully adjudicated hearing with both parties if the judge 
decides not to grant the temporary protective order on ex parte 
grounds.95 
Once a protective order is granted, the respondent is served 
with the paperwork and cannot come near the 
petitioner¾typically within 200 yards.96 The respondent also 
cannot contact the petitioner either directly or indirectly, such as 
by contacting friends or family.97 If he or she does so, the petitioner 
can call the police or file additional paperwork with the court to 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Victim’s Rights, supra note 89 (stating that the filer “must be a victim 
of family violence or stalking” in order to be qualified to file for a protective order). 
 91. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how a victim 
of domestic violence files for a protective order);  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (“You will then see a judge who will consider giving you an emergency 
[temporary protective order].”). 
 92. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (“If the judge grants the ex parte [temporary protective order], you will be 
given a date to return to court for a more detailed hearing.”). 
 93. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (“At this second hearing, you must show that the ex parte [temporary 
protective order] should be extended.”). 
 94. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (describing the judicial procedure of filing a claim for a temporary 
protective order). 
 95. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (detailing the process of how one receives a protective order in Georgia). 
 96. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (stating that a temporary protective order prohibits “the abuser from 
doing certain things”). 
 97. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (stating that a temporary protective order requires “the abuser to do 
certain things that are needed to keep you and your children safe”). 
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document the violation.98 Under either circumstance the 
respondent can be arrested, jailed, and prosecuted under various 
charges.99 
5.  Leaving the Home 
States and the federal government have enacted laws to 
address the housing concerns victims of domestic violence have 
when deciding to leave their abusers.100 While the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) works to protect victims from discrimination 
on the basis of their status as domestic violence victims, landlords 
have historically been able to find loopholes in the statute that 
allow them to evict victims because of their status.101 VAWA is 
limited in its scope, protecting only victims who are residents of 
federally subsidized housing.102 State legislatures have attempted 
to bridge this gap in protection by passing laws that protect victims 
who reside in privately owned residences.103 Newly enacted state 
statutes go so far as to allow victims of domestic violence to 
terminate a private lease early so the victim may escape his or her 
abuser without financial penalty.104 While older statutes and 
                                                                                                     
 98. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see also Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89 (detailing the victim’s rights and recourses throughout the entire process). 
 99. Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52;  see Victim’s Rights, supra 
note 89. 
 100. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (serving as the primary federal law protecting female victims of 
domestic violence);  see also, e.g.,  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) 
(explaining the housing protections for domestic violence victims in Colorado). 
 101. See S. 47 (identifying several ways victims are protected from 
discrimination and landlord mistreatment);  see also Johnson v. Palumbo, 60 
N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2017) (exemplifying how a landlord could utilize a 
loophole to get around VAWA, claiming that the victim did not follow proper 
procedure of adding a resident to her lease so he evicted her). 
 102. See S. 47 (noting that the act protects victims who reside in government 
subsidized housing). 
 103. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (specifying that the statute 
protects victims who reside in privately owned housing);  N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (addressing how state law protects victims in privately 
owned housing). 
 104. See § 44-7-23 (noting that victims of domestic violence may terminate a 
private lease early to escape a domestically violent situation if they follow the 
proper procedures). 
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VAWA mostly protected against discrimination and eviction, the 
newer state statutes recognize the need for some victims to leave 
their home to avoid abuse.105 
Still, while laws protecting victims of domestic violence 
continue to develop, one issue that remains is the discrepancies 
among the state statutes.106 Without consistency, domestic 
violence victims are frequently left uncertain about the protections 
available and what they must do to satisfy their state’s law.107 
Inconsistencies also create problems for lawyers and judges who 
are unsure about what they can argue and order.108 This Note will 
address the discrepancies and offer a potential solution in the form 
of a model universal statute. 
II.  Constitutional Law:  The Effect of the Constitution on Tenants’ 
Rights 
Scholars, lawyers, and judges have considered how several 
aspects of the Constitution could apply to the protection of 
domestic violence victims, including the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, property law concerns, and the Article I 
Section 10 Contract Clause.109 These elements of the Constitution 
                                                                                                     
 105. See Elly Yu, Bill Would Let Domestic Violence Victims Break Leases 
Early, WABE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.wabe.org/bill-let-domestic-violence-
victims-break-leases-early/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“We know that a number 
of victims of domestic violence do not leave for many reasons, and one of them is 
an economic reason that they cannot afford to go somewhere else . . . .”) 
[https://perma.cc/VH8A-ZS5L]. 
 106. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (representing a 
statute that is very extensive and provides very clear protection for victims);  see 
also MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-5A-02 (West 2011) (representing a statute 
that is too minimal and does not provide enough protective measures or clarity). 
 107. See State Laws, supra note 25 (providing a description of each state’s law 
regarding housing protections for victims of domestic violence in a clear and 
concise manner). 
 108. See Meister v. Kansas City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *5 
(D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (explaining a need for further legal development of the 
topic for the court to feel comfortable adjudicating the case accurately and 
confidently). 
 109. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1866 (noting how different aspects of the 
Constitution could be interpreted to protect victims of domestic violence, as well 
as protect landlords’ property and contract rights). 
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could potentially provide protection for both the domestic violence 
victims and the landlords.110 
A.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment states, “nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”111 Lawyers and scholars have attempted to 
argue that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies 
to the protection of individuals’ bodies, but several courts have 
chosen to neither extend the Due Process Clause protection in 
domestic violence cases nor recognize a “fundamental right to be 
free from private acts of violence . . . .”112 The Supreme Court has 
determined that “the Due Process Clause[] generally confer[s] no 
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be 
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the 
government itself may not deprive the individual.”113 Yet, the 
judicial system has begun to support that the “intimate and 
personal choices . . . central to personal dignity and autonomy are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”114 
While the Fourteenth Amendment may protect personal 
dignity and autonomy, courts have been hesitant to specify that 
freedom from domestic violence is included in those protections.115 
                                                                                                     
 110. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1873–74 (articulating attempts to protect 
victims and landlords by utilizing property rights aspects, such as redistribution). 
 111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 112. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1865;  see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (explaining how the Constitution 
cannot be used to protect private individuals from violence);  see also Jones v. 
Union County, 296 F.3d 417, 426–28 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff did 
not have a cognizable equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 
for the defendant’s failure to serve an ex parte protection order in a timely 
manner). 
 113. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (1989). 
 114. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 915 (1992). 
 115. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 186 (noting that applying substantive due 
process to the protection of individuals from domestic violence is improper 
because history does not support “such an expansive reading of the constitutional 
text”);  see, e.g., Jones, 296 F.3d at 426–28 (emphasizing that due process and 
Fourteenth Amendment protections do not support special protection of domestic 
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Some federal courts have recognized that the government has at 
least some duty to protect domestic violence victims by noting that 
“[j]ust as the government has a responsibility to protect children 
from an abusive parent, so too does the government have a 
responsibility to protect a victim of domestic violence from her 
partner . . . .”116 Still, the Supreme Court has chosen not to 
“expand the concept of substantive due process”117 to these types of 
liberty interests “without the guidance of the more specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”118 The Court views the Fourteenth 
Amendment as protecting citizens from the state and not from one 
another.119 It shares an unwillingness to create the fundamental 
right of protecting individuals from domestic violence through 
common law judicial decisions.120 
Had the Supreme Court chosen to recognize protection from 
domestic violence as a fundamental right, both the federal 
government and states would more likely be able to protect 
victims.121 Victims would be better protected if the right were 
deemed fundamental because courts would review lease 
termination clauses and other property rights concerns more 
favorably toward the victim.122 Courts would have to review 
domestic violence victims’ claims against landlords under a strict 
                                                                                                     
violence victims).
 116. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 117. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
 118. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). 
 119. See id. (noting the role of the State Action Doctrine). 
 120. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 
(1989) (presenting a decision that does not support the recognition of protection 
from domestic violence as a protected fundamental right);  see also Jackson v. City 
of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (addressing the Constitution’s 
protection of individual private actors, describing it as a “charter of negative 
rather than positive liberties . . . protect[ing] Americans from oppression by state 
government, not . . . secur[ing] them basic governmental services”). 
 121. See Symposium, The Constitution and the Obligations of Government to 
Secure the Material Preconditions for a Good Society:  Rights, Capabilities, and 
the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1923 (2001) (“[W]e might reason that 
we have a positive right to security against private violence because of a yet more 
fundamental right to security against extreme deprivation or impoverishment 
that threatens fundamental human capabilities, regardless of whether that 
vulnerability can be attributed to . . . undue private aggression.”). 
 122. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1865 (“A state’s asserted interests in such 
penalties would almost certainly involve respect for private contracts and the 
promotion of stability in the housing market.”). 
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scrutiny standard of review, which is appropriate when evaluating 
fundamental rights issues.123 By applying this standard of review, 
a state would have to show that its actions were legitimate and 
done for a compelling purpose that is narrowly tailored and 
necessary.124 But the Court has yet to establish this fundamental 
right and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has 
proven fairly unsuccessful in protecting domestic violence victims 
thus far.125 
B.  Property Law in the Constitution 
Landlords and tenants both have property rights that are 
rooted in the judicial and constitutional tradition of commitment 
to individual liberty.126 These traditional rights include the concept 
of absolutist ownership and “protecting property from 
redistribution.”127 Justice John Harlan articulated the absolutist 
view of property rights in 1897 by recognizing that “[d]ue 
protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital 
principle of republican institutions.”128 Scholar James W. Ely 
analyzed this statement, concluding that “[h]istorically, property 
ownership was viewed as establishing the economic basis for 
freedom from governmental coercion and the enjoyment of 
                                                                                                     
 123. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) 
(explaining that the Court will not interpret and treat all rights the same, as it 
will apply strict scrutiny to fundamental rights, such as those found in the Bill of 
Rights). 
 124. See generally Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (noting how 
a state’s action must not only be legitimate, but also narrowly tailored and 
necessary to survive strict scrutiny). 
 125. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (1989) (“[The Fourteenth Amendment’s] 
purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State 
protected them from each other.”). 
 126. See JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT:  A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS  3 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2008) (“From the time of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court has 
favored the creation of a national market and safeguarded the rights of property 
owners.”). 
 127. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 274 (1990);  see also ELY, supra note 126, at 5 (addressing 
courts’ historic protection of the “disadvantaged”). 
 128. Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–36 
(1897). 
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liberty.”129 Freedom from government coercion and freedom to 
enjoy liberty speak to both the landlords’ concerns today and the 
tenants’ concerns.  
Landlords tend to support the absolutist view of property 
rights and the desire to be free from government intervention.130 
Many landlords feel that, because they own their property and 
have established contracts with tenants, the government should 
respect those private interactions and not intrude for the purpose 
of allowing tenants to terminate their leases early.131 In their view, 
it is not their problem if a tenant has a personal issue and that 
issue should not mean that landlord rights are infringed upon.132 
As owners, landlords cherish the right to exploit their property for 
profit.133 They assert that personal and private relationships of 
their tenants should not permit governmental interference in the 
contract between landlords and tenants.134 
 When testifying against a Washington state bill that would 
allow domestic violence victims to terminate their leases early 
after fulfilling certain requirements, one landlord expressed his 
concern for property owners’ rights by claiming that “[t]here are 
already too many protections in the law for victims.135 This bill 
opens the door and could impact other types of contracts such as 
for cars or mortgages.”136 Traditionally, this landlord’s concern 
would be accepted by the government because the historic 
                                                                                                     
 129. ELY, supra note 126, at 3. 
 130. See Cary Spivak & Mary Spicuzza, Some Wisconsin Lawmakers Double 
as Landlords—and Have Passed Laws that Undermine Renters’ Rights, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (June 14, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/investigations/2019/06/14/wisconsin-
lawmaker-landlords-change-rental-laws-not-favor-tenants-renters-
rights/1210327001/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (sharing a Republican lawmaker 
and  landlord’s view that “as a conservative, [he] fundamentally believe[s] in the 
idea of private property rights”) [https://perma.cc/5Z8C-6AE7]. 
 131. See H.R. Rep. No. 2EHB-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004) (documenting landlord 
testimony claiming there are too many laws that protect victims already). 
 132. See id. (sharing a landlord’s testimony against a bill that would allow 
domestic violence victims to terminate their lease early for the purpose of 
escaping an abusive home). 
 133. See id. (providing a landlord’s testimony emphasizing the landlord’s 
interest in private property rights). 
 134. See id. (emphasizing the landlords’ interest in private property rights). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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“protection given to property was fully consistent with one major 
theme of American constitutionalism—the restraint of government 
power over individuals.”137 
 As time has progressed and cultural perceptions of rights have 
evolved, this absolutist view has begun to fade.138 “[A] study of the 
constitutional status of property and economic interests reveals 
much about the attitudes and aspirations of successive 
generations.”139 Landlords often still attempt to argue the 
absolutist view during legislative hearings and court proceedings, 
but modern courts’ and legislatures’ established rejection of that 
viewpoint leaves their efforts likely unsuccessful.140 
1.  Human Dignity and Property Rights 
Because traditional interpretations of the Constitution protect 
human dignity and the freedom to enjoy liberty, courts have 
construed the Constitution in a way that is contrary to the 
absolutist view of property rights.141 Early in American history 
courts began to establish exceptions to the absolutist view of 
property rights by recognizing assertions of nuisance claims and 
rights to hunt on unenclosed land.142 Judicial rulings in favor of 
eminent domain power further limited the absolutist view.143 Ely 
asserts that “a drastic source of interference with property rights 
is eminent domain—the power to compel a transfer of property 
                                                                                                     
 137. ELY, supra note 126, at 3. 
 138. See ELY, supra note 126, at 3 (addressing the changing perception of 
property rights). 
 139. ELY, supra note 126, at 3. 
 140. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 4 (proposing a bill to provide domestic 
violence victims with certain tenant rights, in spite of the opposition of landlords).   
 141. See ELY, supra note 126, at 5 (“[A]t no time has the [Supreme] Court 
blocked all regulatory or redistributive legislation or sought to impose a strict 
laissez-faire regime.”). 
 142. See Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] LRE & I. App. 3 (HL) 330 (noting in the 
dissent that an individual should not have absolute ability to use their land as 
they chose if it harms another’s enjoyment of his land);  see also Pierson v. Post, 
3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (articulating whose property a fox is when it is 
captured on open land). 
 143. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1876) (providing an early 
understanding that the Fifth Amendment provides eminent domain power). 
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from a private owner to the government for public use.”144 More 
recently, courts’ holdings have reflected a recognition of human 
dignity rights as preeminent over absolute property rights.145 
These judicial rulings have established a new tradition of 
balancing the absolute right to property with the protection of 
humanity and enjoyment of liberty, ultimately favoring human 
dignity and freedom of enjoyment over absolutism.146 However, 
while a variety of classes of individuals are protected under 
precedent, domestic violence victims still suffer in court when 
trying to argue for the protection of their human dignity.147 
The rejection of absolutism has not spread to cases concerning 
domestic violence.148 Landlords have been successful in their 
claims to either evict a victim or not allow her to terminate her 
lease early for the purpose of living in a habitable, safe 
environment, interestingly contradicting the intent of the implied 
warranty of habitability.149 The implied warranty of habitability—
a property law concept—guarantees a safe and sanitary home, 
providing a tenant with quiet enjoyment of the dwelling.150 
Landlords’ failure to cooperate with tenants’ reasonable requests 
                                                                                                     
 144. ELY, supra note 126, at 5. 
 145. See Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) (explaining the 
concept of implied warranty of habitability and how a tenant can be financially 
protected when living conditions are inhumane). 
 146. See ELY, supra note 126, at 5 (“[J]udicial review of economic and social 
legislation, such as health and safety regulations, has not always resulted in 
rulings favorable to business interests.”). 
 147. See Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 677–78 (D. Vt. 2005) 
(exemplifying a case where the victim suffered domestic violence, the landlord 
violated the Violence Against Women’s Act, but the victim still lost her case);  see 
also Mangan Realty, LLC v. Anthony, 64 Misc. 3d 686, 689 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2019) 
(determining that the landlord may have had other legitimate reasons to evict the 
victim-tenant aside from her status as a domestic violence victim, rejecting her 
claim). 
 148. See Bouley, 394 F. Supp. 2d at 677–78 (emphasizing that victim who 
suffered from domestic violence lost her case despite there being little evidence 
that the landlord had preexisting problems with victim as a tenant;  see also 
Mangan Realty, LLC, 64 Misc. 3d at 689 (identifying a case where a victim of 
domestic violence had her claim dismissed because the landlord presented other 
reasons for why tenant was evicted). 
 149. See Mangan Realty, LLC, 64 Misc. 3d at 680 (verifying how courts will 
weigh the law in favor of the landlord and not the victim). 
 150. See Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Mass. 2009) (explaining 
what the implied warranty of habitability entails). 
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to ensure a safe dwelling contradicts the intent of the implied 
warranty of habitability.151 Enacting legislation has become the 
most plausible method to overcome the rejection domestic violence 
victims face when attempting to use the judicial system to uphold 
their liberty interests.152 
2.  The Contract Clause and Property Rights 
Some landlords reference the Contract Clause, Article I, 
Section 10 of the United States Constitution, when trying to 
restrict domestic violence victims from terminating their leases 
early.153 The Contract Clause states, “No state shall . . . pass any 
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts . . . .”154 Historically, “the [C]ontract 
[C]lause was the most widely used protection of individual 
property rights against state regulation.”155 However, courts’ 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause diminished 
the power of the Contract Clause.156 The Contract Clause no longer 
was a shield against government interference with contracts in 
cases addressing property rights.157 Courts have continuously 
                                                                                                     
 151. See id. (explaining that a visitor’s right to collect damages for an injury 
caused by a breach of implied warranty of habitability is derived from a tenant’s 
expectation to invite guests and a landlord’s contractual obligation to deliver and 
maintain a habitable premise). 
 152. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 1 (“By this act, the legislature intends to 
increase safety for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking by 
removing barriers to safety and offering protection against discrimination.”).  
 153. See id. at 4 (noting via landlord testimony how the bill would harm 
contract credibility). 
 154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 155. Janet I. Levine, The Contract Clause:  A Constitutional Basis for 
Invalidating State Legislation, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927, 930 (1979). 
 156. See They Can’t Do That, Can They? Constitutional Limitations on the 
Seizure of Underwater Mortgage, JONES DAY (June 2012), 
https://www.jonesday.com/They_Cant_Do_That/# (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) 
(“Contracts constitute property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and 
are susceptible to a ‘taking’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause. To 
determine whether a contract right has been taken, courts apply either a 
categorical test or . . . fact-dependent analysis employed in regulatory takings 
cases.”) [https://perma.cc/HVL4-FBKQ];  see also, e.g., Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Comm’rs of Jay Cty., 57 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1995) (detailing how the Eminent 
Domain power supersedes contracts). 
 157. See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case 
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exercised their ability to neglect the Contract Clause when 
considering property law issues, such as cases involving adverse 
possession claims.158 Successful adverse possession cases allow an 
individual to gain title to a piece of property simply by fulfilling 
certain elements that demonstrate how that individual utilized the 
property more than the actual owner, disregarding the 
contract-holder’s legal ownership.159 Adverse possession reflects 
the judicial system’s waning appreciation for contract sanctity 
regarding property.160 
Landlords have taken issue with courts and legislatures that 
discount the Contract Clause, particularly regarding federal and 
state laws that protect domestic violence victims from unfriendly 
lease provisions.161 Many landlords have been vocal about their 
distaste for these laws, fearing “that early-termination statutes 
create a special class of people exempt from general leasing rules 
and eventually will lead to domestic violence victims having the 
freedom to violate other contractual obligations.”162 During a 
Washington State House Judiciary Committee hearing regarding 
the passage of a bill to protect domestic violence victims when 
renting a residence, several members of housing associations and 
                                                                                                     
Study in the Relationship between Individual Liberties and Constitutional 
Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 272 (1988) (articulating the effects of the Taking 
Clause). 
 158. See generally Gurwit v. Kannatzer, 788 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
(demonstrating that one couple was granted title to land owned by another by 
fulfilling the requirements of adverse possession);  see also Howard v. Kunto, 477 
P.2d 210 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (showing how fulfilling the adverse possession 
requirements allows an individual to gain title of real property regardless of who 
actually owned it). 
 159. See More v. Stills, 307 S.W.3d 71, 77–78 (Ky. 2010) (defining adverse 
possession). 
 160. See Gurwit, 788 S.W.2d at 295 (exemplifying a case where the court 
granted a couple their quiet title action through adverse possession despite the 
title for the land being owned by another couple).  
 161. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 4 (sharing testimony contesting the limited 
liberty of landlords regarding contracts with domestic violence victims);  see also 
New Domestic Violence Law Impacts Your Rights, 7 LANDLORD NEWS 1, 1–3 (Aug. 
2005), https://www.thslawfirm.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/52_HTSPCLandlordNewsAugust2005.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2019) [hereinafter LANDLORD NEWS] (articulating concerns landlords 
have with the laws) [https://perma.cc/TR5V-A7L6]. 
 162. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1868. 
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landlord interest groups testified against the bill.163 They claimed 
that “[t]he bill creates a new special class of people who don’t have 
to follow the rules . . . . Now anyone can say I am a victim and then 
get out of a lease.”164  
Additionally, Landlord News, a newsletter published by a law 
firm in Colorado, addressed landlord concerns about legislation 
allowing domestic violence victims to terminate their leases 
early.165 Following the passage of one of these bills, the newsletter 
published a story expressing “concern[ ] that the new law will be 
abused by some residents to escape their rental responsibilities.”166 
Ultimately, the landlord concerns fail to appreciate the measures 
included in these bills that require proof of domestic violence, such 
as a court order, and why the tenant needs to terminate his or her 
lease early.167 
While courts are willing to overlook the Contract Clause when 
considering certain property law issues, many do not place victims’ 
rights in that category.168 Therefore, both federal and state 
legislatures have stepped in to promulgate laws that provide more 
protections for domestic violence victims, furthering the modern 
practice of discounting the Contract Clause in favor of human 
dignity concerns.169 
Ultimately, legal protections of the United States Constitution 
have yet to provide proper recourse for domestic violence victims 
                                                                                                     
 163. See 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 4 (sharing landlord testimony against the 
bill). 
 164. Id.  
 165. See LANDLORD NEWS, supra note 161  (“Only time will tell if our concern 
becomes reality.”). 
 166. LANDLORD NEWS, supra note 161. 
 167. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (detailing each of the 
requirements that must be satisfied to be able to terminate a lease early). 
 168. See Jennings v. Hous. Auth., No. WDQ-13-2164, 2014 WL 346641 (D. Md. 
Jan. 29, 2014) (demonstrating a lack of judicial understanding of the patterns of 
domestic violence, allowing the judge to exercise complete discretion against the 
victim);  see also Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–
10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (exemplifying judicial interpretation that did not 
allow the judge to rule in favor of the victim). 
 169. See Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 
1902 (1994) (representing the federal effort to protect domestic violence victims 
in rentals);  see also § 38-12-402 (exemplifying one of several state statutes 
protecting domestic violence victims in rentals). 
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regarding housing concerns.170 The federal government took the 
first step to resolve the issue legally when it ratified VAWA.171 
III.  Federal Law: The Violence Against Women Act 
A. History of VAWA 
Legislatures, both federal and state, have in recent years been 
more aggressive than courts about moving the balance between 
private property rights and victims’ rights in favor of victims.172 
VAWA was first enacted in 1994 as an effort to combat violent 
crime against women.173 Creation of the act was prompted by a 
long history of violence against women, particularly intimate 
partner violence.174 “The public and the criminal justice 
system . . . [began] to view family violence as a crime rather than 
a private family matter.”175 President Bill Clinton signed into law 
the first iteration of VAWA.176 When remarking on VAWA, 
then-Senator Joe Biden clarified that “[t]he shortfalls of legal 
responses and the need for a change in attitudes toward violence 
against women were primary reasons cited for the passage of 
VAWA.”177 The Act has been revised several times, including in 
                                                                                                     
 170. See tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (demonstrating the need for remedies for 
domestic violence victims in terms of housing).  
 171. See id. (serving as the first iteration of VAWA). 
 172. See id. (identifying congressional attempts to pass legislation that will 
provide remedies for domestic violence victims);  see also 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 
1 (identifying Washington State’s attempt to pass legislation to protect victim of 
domestic violence in regard to housing).  
 173. See THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA):  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, 
FUNDING, AND REAUTHORIZATION 1 (Cong. Research Serv., 2d ed. 2018) 
[hereinafter HISTORICAL OVERVIEW] (“The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 
was originally enacted in 1994 (P.L. 103-322). It addressed congressional concerns 
about violent crime, and violence against women in particular, in several ways.”). 
 174. See id. (noting that in the 1960s the violent crime rate steadily role, in 
the 1970s organizations began to demand attention be paid to violence against 
women, and in the 1980s research studies began to focus on violence against 
women). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. at 2 (“In 1994, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into 
law, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322), 
which included VAWA as Title IV.”). 
 177. Id. 
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2000, 2005, and, most recently, in 2013 under President Barack 
Obama.178 The first version of the Act was primarily an effort to 
utilize the criminal justice system to address community responses 
to violence against women.179 The 2000 revision also addressed 
crimes of dating violence and stalking.180 The first effort to address 
domestic violence victims’ housing concerns was added to VAWA 
in 2005.181 President Obama’s 2013 reauthorization added 
additional housing rights for domestic violence victims, and 
additional protections for Native Americans and members of the 
LGBTQ community.182 
The 2013 iteration is the current version of VAWA.183 The 
included housing provisions are the federal measures that are in 
effect today to protect domestic violence victims.184 “VAWA 2013 
added housing rights for victims of domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault, and stalking, including a provision stating 
that applicants may not be denied public housing assistance based 
on their status as victims of domestic violence, dating violence, 
sexual assault, or stalking.”185 The Act also includes provisions 
allowing landlords to transfer victims to other publicly funded 
housing if similar units are available so the abuser will not know 
the victim’s new address and includes protections against eviction 
based on a person’s status as a victim.186 “Additionally, [VAWA] 
                                                                                                     
 178. See id. (noting how the Act has been revised). 
 179. See What Is the Violence Against Women Act?, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
HOTLINE, https://www.thehotline.org/resources/vawa/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) 
(“VAWA 1994 fostered: Community-coordinated responses that brought together, 
for the first time, the criminal justice system, the social services system, and 
private nonprofit organizations responding to domestic violence and sexual 
assault.”) [https://perma.cc/CUB8-KNK9]. 
 180. See id. (noting what was added to the Act in 2000). 
 181. See id. (“VAWA 2005 created notable new focus areas such 
as . . . protecting individuals from unfair eviction due to their status as victims of 
domestic violence or stalking.”). 
 182. See id. (clarifying what was added to the 2013 version of VAWA). 
 183. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21 (identifying what the 
current law is). 
 184. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21 (articulating how the 
2013 version of the act addressed housing concerns). 
 185. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21. 
 186. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21 (“[VAWA] required each 
executive department carrying out a covered housing program to adopt a plan 
whereby tenants who are victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual 
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require[s] the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) to establish policies and procedures under which a victim 
requesting such a transfer may receive Section 8 assistance under 
the U.S. Housing Act of 1937.”187 Prior to VAWA, “Section 8 
tenants could only move and continue to receive housing assistance 
if they notified the [public housing agency] ahead of time, 
terminated their existing lease within the lease provisions, and 
located acceptable housing. Now, Section 8 tenants can circumvent 
these requirements . . . .”188 VAWA allows victims to sidestep 
burdensome requirements if they “(1) complied with all other 
Section 8 obligations, (2) moved in order to protect someone who is 
or has been a domestic violence victim, and (3) ‘reasonably 
believed’ that they were ‘imminently threatened by harm from 
further violence’ by staying in the subsidized unit.”189 
While these provisions were a crucial step to protect domestic 
violence victims, VAWA only protects those who reside in federally 
subsidized housing and not those who rent from private 
landlords.190 The Act serves to prevent landlords from evicting 
victims of domestic violence, but it fails to allow victims to 
terminate their leases early for the purposes of avoiding abuse.191 
VAWA also unintentionally includes various loopholes that 
landlords have used.192 Several court cases addressing housing 
provisions of VAWA identify ways landlords have been able to 
legally avoid abiding by the Act.193 Case law demonstrates how 
                                                                                                     
assault, or stalking can be transferred to another available and safe unit of 
assisted housing.”). 
 187. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173, at 21–22 (defining Section 8 
assistance as the government’s payment of rental housing to private landlords on 
behalf of low-income individuals). 
 188. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1870. 
 189. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1870 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5) (2012)). 
 190. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (articulating the elements of the current VAWA). 
 191. See id. (outlining current protections for domestic violence victims under 
VAWA). 
 192. See Johnson v. Palumbo, 60 N.Y.S.3d 472, 474 (App. Div. 2017) (sharing 
how one landlord used a paperwork loophole to evict a victim). 
 193. See id. (emphasizing how landlords have used loopholes in VAWA to 
circumvent the Act);  see also Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, 
slip op. at 6–10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (noting how a landlord was able to 
evict a victim and skirt VAWA by claiming the victim participated in the violence). 
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landlords sometimes successfully exploit loopholes in statutory 
provisions that are unfavorable to tenants but other times fail to 
garner a verdict in their favor despite efforts to use loopholes.194 
B.  The Case of Pamela LeMasters 
In a 2016 case, a landlord availed himself of a VAWA loophole 
to evict a victim by claiming that the victim did not follow proper 
procedure of adding a resident to her lease.195 The landlord, 
Gorsuch Homes, Inc., claimed the tenant, Pamela LeMasters, had 
violated a provision of her lease by allowing a “non-trespassed 
individual onto the property continually” and permitting “criminal 
activity” by that visitor.196 During a hearing, the landlord testified 
that LeMasters’s husband had trespassed onto the property even 
after he was served with a no-trespass order resulting from 
instances of domestic violence.197 Several staff members of Gorsuch 
Homes, Inc. testified to witnessing events of domestic violence.198 
The landlord testified that when he served the husband with the 
order, LeMasters appeared thankful.199 Ultimately, the husband 
trespassed again.200 “According to [the landlord], LeMasters did 
not deny that [the husband] has been on the property, but tried to 
explain that she could not get him to leave because she was 
financially reliant on [him].”201 LeMasters testified that, though 
her husband was abusive toward her, she did not call the police 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 6–10 (exemplifying a landlord 
successfully exploiting a loophole in court);  see also Johnson, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 472 
(exemplifying a landlord attempting to utilize a loophole). 
 195. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 6–10 (detailing the elements of the 
case). 
 196. Id. at 2. 
 197. See id. (“Bailey testified that the specific activities that gave rise to the 
eviction notice were separate occasions when James LeMasters . . . LeMasters’s 
husband, trespassed on Gorsuch Homes’s property after being served with a no 
trespass order.”). 
 198. See id. at 3–4 (explaining how several staff members of the landlord had 
witnessed incidences of abuse, including one incident when a staff member offered 
to call the police for LeMasters). 
 199. See id. at 2 (“Bailey added that LeMasters appeared grateful and 
promised that James would no longer step foot on the property.”). 
 200. See id. (noting the husband returned to the property uninvited). 
 201. Id. at 6. 
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because she was “scared.”202 “Further, she explained that her only 
source of income was the child support paid by [her husband] and 
that she was afraid that if he were to go to prison, then the child 
support payments would stop.”203 
Even though LeMasters’s situation is a common experience of 
victims and the law has provided recourse for such in the past, this 
court still ruled in the landlord’s favor.204 LeMasters asserted that 
the landlord had evicted her due to her husband’s “criminal 
activity” of domestic violence, “which was outside the limited 
allegation of ‘trespass’ contained in the written notice of 
termination.”205 The court disagreed and claimed that LeMasters 
“was evicted due to her willing participation in [her husband’s] 
multiple and unlawful violations of the landlord’s no trespass 
order.”206 Those who understand the patterns of domestic violence 
recognize that a victim remaining in a violent situation out of fear 
cannot be construed as willingly participating in the partner’s 
actions because the victim is under insuperable pressure to 
tolerate and abet it.207 
Further, the judge asserted that staff members’ testimony 
regarding witnessing incidents of domestic violence was 
“merely . . . an explanation of the circumstances which led to the 
reason for the no trespass order and not as an independent ground 
for the termination . . . .”208 This interpretation ignores the 
                                                                                                     
 202. Id. at 10. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Wendy L. Patrick, Why Domestic Violence Victims Don’t “Just Leave”, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-
bad-looks-good/201804/why-domestic-violence-victims-dont-just-leave (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“Some of the reasons they discovered included financial 
need, lack of another place to go, as well as reported lack of help from law 
enforcement.”) [https://perma.cc/W3J6-XHBC];  see also Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. 
LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (noting 
that the judge held in favor of Gorsuch Homes, Inc.). 
 205. Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 16. 
 206. Id. at 16. 
 207. See Why Do Abuse Victims Stay?, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ROUNDTABLE, 
https://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/abuse-victims-stay.html (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (sharing how victims of domestic violence often feel 
trapped . . . because they cannot reasonably leave their abuser for lack of 
financial support, a place to go, or fear that the abuser will find and kill them) 
[https://perma.cc/ZP8C-KG8K]. 
 208. Gorsuch Homes, Inc., slip op. at 7. 
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landlord’s assertion that part of LeMasters’s violation was her 
husband’s “criminal activity.”209 Here, the judge misinterprets the 
facts to determine that the husband’s “criminal activity” was not a 
violation that led to eviction, thereby discounting the landlord’s 
explanation for eviction, which violated VAWA, and asserting his 
own reasoning so as to sidestep finding a VAWA violation.210 
This case demonstrates how landlords have been able to take 
advantage of statute wording gaps and how judges’ lack of 
understanding about the common behavior of victims allows 
misinterpretation of victims’ actions.211 If VAWA protections had 
been applied to the case, the landlord would not have been able to 
evict LeMasters if the eviction was due to her status as a victim of 
domestic violence.212 However, the landlord asserted that 
LeMasters’s actions in allegedly permitting her husband to violate 
the trespass provision of the lease was the reason she was evicted, 
not because she was a victim of domestic violence.213 The landlord 
presented the facts of the case to indicate that LeMasters allowed 
her husband to enter the home, which disregards the husband’s 
power over LeMasters.214 By presenting the case in this way, the 
judge did not have to apply VAWA, even though the case truly 
revealed a VAWA violation.215 
                                                                                                     
 209. See id. at 2 (“Bailey testified that LeMasters was being evicted for 
material noncompliance with the lease. Next, counsel asked, ‘Specifically in what 
manner?’, and Bailey replied, ‘Specifically criminal activity by a visitor.’”). 
 210. See id. at 5 (“[I]t is clear from the record that all of the witnesses who 
testified as to alleged criminal activity . . . introduced that testimony merely as 
an explanation of the circumstances which led to the reason for the no trespass 
order and not as an independent ground for the termination as alleged by 
LeMasters.”). 
 211. See id. (demonstrating how reliance on the fact that a lease provision was 
violated, not acknowledging that it was violated because of domestic violence, is 
a method for landlords to skirt VAWA protections and how judges allow this 
process to continue). 
 212. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (reflecting a provision of VAWA). 
 213. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 7 (Ohio 
Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (sharing the landlord’s decision to ignore the occurrence 
of domestic violence, claiming an alternate reason so he could evict the victim). 
 214. See id. (demonstrating how the landlord alleged that LeMasters was a 
willing participant, which the judge accepted on its face without considering the 
underlying issue of abuse). 
 215. See id. (revealing how LeMasters was evicted because she was a 
domestic-violence victim). 
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The dissent was better reasoned, stating, “Landlords, such as 
Gorsuch Homes, cannot be allowed to continue to evict tenants, 
such as LeMasters, using vague and overly broad statements 
contained as the grounds for eviction.”216 The dissent recognized 
the truth that LeMasters was evicted in part because she was in a 
relationship with someone who abused her at the home, which 
directly violates VAWA.217 The dissenting opinion rightfully 
requested that courts no longer allow landlords to skirt VAWA 
requirements by improperly claiming a victim violated provisions 
of her lease for a reason that was not driven by her status as a 
victim of domestic violence.218 
C.  The Case of Amanda Chambers Johnson 
In contrast to the ruling in Gorsuch Homes, a judge applied 
VAWA protections in a 2017 case to a victim during her eviction 
proceeding.219 Amanda Chambers Johnson and her five children 
were living in a federally subsidized apartment when she received 
a notice that her lease would be terminated because she violated 
Section 8 housing program rules.220 “The determination to 
terminate her benefits was confirmed based upon the finding that 
she was obligated, but failed, to request permission to add 
Antwone Jordan-McGill (McGill) as an occupant to her subsidized 
                                                                                                     
 216. See id. at 10 (referencing statements about “criminal activity” being the 
reason why LeMasters was evicted). 
 217. See id. (sharing a view on why LeMasters was evicted). 
 218. See id. (reflecting that landlords and courts need to acknowledge the 
presence of domestic violence in an eviction proceeding, instead of relying on 
generalized claims like trespass that do not reflect the relationship between the 
trespasser and the victim, and that courts should not allow eviction in spite of 
domestically violent acts). 
 219. See Johnson v. Palumbo, 154 A.D.3d 231, 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 
(“[W]e conclude that [Johnson] was entitled to the housing protections of VAWA, 
which prohibited her termination from the [Section 8] program on this ground.”). 
 220. See id. at 233  
The petitioner, Amanda Chambers Johnson, lived in an apartment in 
Poughkeepsie with her five children with the assistance of rent subsidy 
benefits under the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. On 
February 11, 2014, she was notified that her benefits under the 
program were being terminated due to alleged violations of the 
program rules.  
(citations omitted). 
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apartment.”221 The landlord failed to acknowledge that Johnson 
did not add McGill’s name because she did not consider him a 
co-tenant. She did not want him there, but McGill forced himself 
into Johnson’s home on multiple occasions.222 Johnson “was 
subjected to an escalating pattern of stalking and abusive behavior 
and domestic violence by McGill, a former intimate partner, whose 
course of abusive and violent conduct against her included his 
unwanted presence in her apartment.”223 Johnson testified that  
McGill “became terrifying.” He started asking the petitioner for keys 
to her apartment. She told him ‘no,’ but, against her wishes, McGill 
took a spare set of keys . . . . He began entering the petitioner’s home 
at will, “whenever he felt like it,” and told her that he would never 
give her back her keys.”224  
When asked why she did not seek out an order of protection, 
Johnson explained to the court what LeMasters’s judge was unable 
to understand: 
I know it’s hard to understand. You never think that someone 
will control you . . . . But when you are in that situation, it’s a 
totally different world . . . . When you are scared of somebody 
and you have five kids to take care of, to get ready for school, to 
go to work, to put on a smile every single day, it changes the 
dynamic of things that become important.225 
Johnson testified that “McGill was ‘just a very wicked individual 
and [I] truly could not have done anything different than what [I] 
did to survive.’”226 
During a hearing to reinstate her lease, the apartment 
complex housing committee ruled in favor of the landlord on the 
grounds that Johnson violated a provision of her lease by not 
adding McGill’s name, which was required because he was there 
                                                                                                     
 221. Id. at 233–34. 
 222. See id. at 239–40 (“[T]he hearing officer nonetheless concluded that there 
was no evidence of violence or fear in June of 2012, and even were there evidence 
of violence that early, he ‘fail[ed] to see how that fear would excuse the [petitioner 
from] requesting to add another family member.’”). 
 223. Id. at 234. 
 224. Id. at 236. 
 225. Id. at 237–38. 
 226. Id. at 237. 
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so often, notwithstanding her defense of the violation.227 The 
landlord testified, “[I] fail to see how that fear would excuse the 
[petitioner from] requesting to add another family member [to her 
lease].”228 The housing committee sided with the landlord and held 
in his favor. Johnson appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court of 
New York Appellate Division.229 
The Supreme Court of New York Appellate Division ruled in 
favor of Johnson.230 The court determined that “[t]here was no 
evidence presented at the hearing from which the hearing officer 
could conclude that the petitioner voluntarily gave McGill 
permission to reside at the contract unit . . . or that his ultimate 
residency there for some period of time was unrelated to the 
domestic violence he perpetrated upon her.”231 The court also 
shared that it would be completely unreasonable for the landlord 
to require Johnson to add McGill as a resident of her home because 
he showed up uninvited so often.232 “[R]equiring the petitioner to 
do so would effectively require her to legitimize his access to the 
contract unit by making him an established part of her household, 
thus giving him greater power and control over her.”233 
VAWA is intended to protect victims from situations like 
Johnson’s, where victims have to choose between remaining in an 
abusive household or keeping stable housing for themselves and 
                                                                                                     
 227. See id. at 239 (noting how even if Johnson was a victim of domestic 
violence, she still could have added her husband, the abuser, to her lease, and by 
not doing so, she was properly evicted for failing to comply with that lease 
provision). 
 228. Id. at 239–40. 
 229. See id. at 240 (“The petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 
78 proceeding in the Supreme Court seeking review of the determination, 
arguing, among other things, that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that VAWA did not prevent her tenancy from being terminated.”). 
 230. See id. at 246 (“In sum, we find that the hearing officer’s determination 
was affected by an error of law and rendered in violation of VAWA.”). 
 231. Id. at 243. 
 232. See id.  
[E]vidence that McGill’s presence in and access to the contract unit 
was the result of conduct that constitutes domestic violence and 
stalking as defined by the VAWA, it would be unreasonable and 
inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to require the petitioner to 
seek permission to add McGill as an occupant of the unit. 
 233. Id. 
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their children.234 The judge concluded that “[t]his is a choice that a 
domestic violence victim should not have to make and we decline 
to read VAWA in such a way, which is plainly inconsistent with its 
salutary purposes.”235 In Johnson’s case, VAWA worked exactly as 
it was intended.236 Thankfully for Johnson, the judge adjudicating 
her case understood the underpinnings of VAWA and ruled in her 
favor.237 Johnson’s case confirms how LeMasters’s case 
demonstrates that unfortunately VAWA is not always applied to 
abuse cases when it could and should be.238 
D.  Harms of Inadequate Legal Representation 
Domestic violence victims who receive poor legal 
representation face additional challenges when entitled to VAWA 
protection.239 A 2014 case reveals how a lawyer’s improper decision 
to not assert a VAWA violation claim, coupled with a judge’s 
apparent bias, allowed a victim of domestic violence to be denied 
housing protection.240 Jennings, the victim, lived in Section 8 
housing with several of her children.241 One of her children, 
Barrett, had “been imprisoned since 2011, and [was] accordingly 
                                                                                                     
 234. See id. (“The hearing officer[] fail[ed] to recognize that McGill’s presence 
in and access to the contract unit was the result of domestic violence [and] did not 
take into account the dynamics of domestic violence . . . .”). 
 235. Id. at 243–44. 
 236. See id. (serving to properly protect a domestic violence victim from 
intimate partner abuse and abuse from her landlord because of her status as a 
victim). 
 237. See id. at 243 (“To [conclude] that [Johnson] violated . . .  Section 
8 . . .  by failing to . . . add McGill as an occupant would place her in the untenable 
position of . . . choos[ing] between . . . an abusive situation . . . or facing the loss 
of the housing assistance . . . . [A] choice that a domestic violence victim should 
not have to make . . . .”). 
 238. See Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–10 
(Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (representing one case of many where VAWA was 
unable to protect domestic violence victims from a landlord’s abuse of power). 
 239. See, e.g., Jennings v. Hous. Auth., No. WDQ-13-2164, 2014 WL 346641 
(D. Md. Jan. 29, 2014) (including both of these issues in this case). 
 240. See id. (demonstrating how Jennings’s lawyer did not even introduce a 
VAWA claim when the Act would have protected her housing rights, while also 
revealing how judges can interpret a case in a way that is severely biased against 
the victim of domestic violence). 
 241. See id. at 1 (noting Jennings’s children’s living situation). 
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‘ineligible to participate in the HCV Program.’”242 Barrett never 
visited or stayed at Jennings’s home.243 “In April 2012, Housing 
Authority employees allegedly contacted Jennings’s landlord, 
Dominion Properties, LLC (Dominion), and ‘compelled’ Dominion 
to ‘fraudulently modif[y] the lease agreement for’ the . . . home, by 
adding Barrett ‘to the list of tenants residing at’ the . . . home 
without Jennings’s ‘written permission.’”244 Jennings then received 
a notice informing her that her Section 8 housing would be 
terminated.245 “The notice advised Jennings that the reasons for 
termination included ‘a 2010 incident of domestic violence of which 
Ms. Jennings was the victim[,] and two 2010 incidents of criminal 
activity by Barrett.’”246 
The primary issue here regarding the challenges of applying 
VAWA to protect domestic violence victims is that Jennings’s 
lawyer failed to assert a claim that the landlord violated VAWA.247 
The landlord blatantly stated that one of his reasons for evicting 
Jennings was because she was a victim of domestic violence, which 
is exactly what VAWA is intended to protect against.248 Jennings 
would have had a far better chance of her case succeeding had the 
lawyer asserted a VAWA violation claim.249 
                                                                                                     
 242. Id.;  see also Housing and Community Development, FAIRFAX COUNTY VA., 
https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/housing/rentalhousing/housingchoicevoucher (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2019) (defining the “Housing Choice Voucher (HVC) Program as 
a federally funded program designed to assist low-income families with their 
housing needs. Participants in the HCV program receive assistance to rent 
private market apartments.”) [https://perma.cc/2FMD-8PCF]. 
 243. See Jennings, 2014 WL 346641, at *3 (explaining whether Barrett 
resided at the residence). 
 244. Id. 
 245. See id. (“In early May 2012, the Housing Authority notified Jennings that 
her participation in the HCV program would be terminated effective June 5, 
2012.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. (representing a failure to assert a claim, here, regarding VAWA, 
that the lawyers’ client could succeed on). 
 248. See id. at *1 (“The notice advised Jennings that the reasons for the 
termination included ‘a 2010 incident of domestic violence of which Ms. Jennings 
was the victim . . . .’”). 
 249. See generally id. (noting why Jennings lost her case, but including facts 
that would apply to the protections of VAWA). 
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The second issue is the judge’s decision not to give credence to 
any of Jennings’s six claims.250 The judge interpreted the law in a 
way that disregarded the blatant wrongs committed against 
Jennings.251 The judge could have recognized a VAWA violation or 
given credibility to Jennings’s claims, accepting her arguments in 
recognition of her lawyer’s poor representation so as to allow her 
claim to succeed under VAWA, but instead harshly adjudicated 
Jennings’s claims.252 The judge acknowledged he understood that 
the Housing Commissioner “told Jennings ‘in front of [the 
landlord], members of the general public[,] and [his] secretary,’ 
that she was a  ‘disgrace to society, a disruption to the community, 
the worst things that ever lived in section 8, and you should teach 
your kids how to stop ruining your life; and, if I could help you, 
which I can, I wouldn’t help you.’”253 The judge also acknowledged 
that the Commissioner blatantly lied to Jennings about her ability 
to appeal her eviction by telling her there was nothing she could 
do.254 
When addressing Jennings’s claims, the judge analyzed her 
strongest arguments last in his final opinion, focusing on the 
procedural flaws in Jennings’s claim as reason why Jennings 
should lose, and disregarded applicable law or public policy that 
would protect Jennings.255 The combination of less-than-astute 
representation and a judge ill-inclined to sympathize with the 
victim left little room for success in a claim regarding eviction due 
to one’s status as a victim.256 
                                                                                                     
 250. See generally id. (concluding that the judge rejected all of Jennings’s 
claims). 
 251. See id. (explaining how the judge was dismissing all of Jennings’s claims 
based on perceived procedural errors, while disregarding direct violations of 
VAWA). 
 252. See id. at *11 (revealing how the judge decided to dismiss all claims based 
on failures to allege enough facts, refusing to interpret the facts that were 
alleged). 
 253. Id. at *1. 
 254. See id. (“He also ‘intentionally lied’ to Jennings ‘about her procedural 
rights’ to appeal the result of the informal hearing by ‘Judicial Review or 
Administrative Mandamus in the Circuit Court’ by telling her ‘there is nothing 
more to do.’”). 
 255. See id. at *3–9 (sharing the pleading mistakes Jennings made, refusing 
to recognize the domestic abuse she had experienced and failing to give adequate 
weight to the mistreatment she experienced regarding housing). 
 256. See generally id. (emphasizing elements of the case that disfavored 
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E.  The Need for Legal Protection in Addition to VAWA 
The bulk of cases that demonstrate issues with VAWA’s ability 
to protect domestic violence victims indicate that the Act is 
insufficient because it does not apply to private leases and 
loopholes are easily found.257 Several states’ recent promulgation 
of statutes filling the gaps in coverage is a positive step to increase 
protections.258 Aside from extending lease termination ability to 
private lease holders, the state statutes also tend to address early 
termination of leases and eviction concerns.259 Still, inconsistencies 
among state statutes and the limited number of states that have 
promulgated statutes pose continued challenges for domestic 
violence victims.260 
IV.  State Statutes 
A.  State Police Powers 
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants states 
police powers.261 These powers provide states with broad rights 
that allow their legislatures to interfere with private leases for the 
purpose of protecting domestic violence victims.262 “The police 
                                                                                                     
Jennings having success in her claim).   
 257. See, e.g., Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. LeMasters, No. 10-15-18, slip op. at 6–
10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 31, 2016) (demonstrating how landlords can find ways 
around VAWA protections via loopholes);  see also Jennings v. Hous. Auth., No. 
WDQ-13-2164, 2014 WL 346641 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2014) (showing how judges’ 
interpretations and lawyer mistakes allow VAWA protections to be ineffective). 
 258. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (serving as an 
example of a state statute that provides housing protection for domestic violence 
victims with private leases). 
 259. See, e.g., id. (protecting domestic violence victims when trying to 
terminate a private lease early to escape an abuser). 
 260. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 70, at 1864 (noting that 
“[e]arly-termination statutes provide victims with the assurance that 
negotiations lack, in addition to offering a palatable alternative to enduring more 
abuse,” but still not all states have statutes and the states that do have statutes 
are not all alike). 
 261. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (articulating the police powers). 
 262. See, e.g., § 38-12-402 (demonstrating a state legislature’s exercise of its 
police power to draft legislation protecting domestic violence victims with housing 
concerns). 
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power is the authority of government to adopt and enforce 
measures to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare” of state citizens.263 “[T]o the extent that the exercise of the 
police power is reasonable and has a real relationship to a 
legitimate governmental purpose, it has been held not to infringe 
constitutional rights despite some incidental interference with 
individual rights.”264 Some state courts have properly recognized a 
state’s ability to enact statutes that specifically protect domestic 
violence victims in private leases.265 In particular, these courts 
have recognized that “authorizing exclusion of perpetrators of 
domestic violence from the residences of their victims is 
reasonable, and it has a real relationship to the purpose of 
protecting victims of domestic violence from further harm.”266 “The 
protection of victims of domestic violence from further harm has as 
its purpose the protection of the public welfare, which is a proper 
exercise of the police power . . . .”267 
With this police power, over the past ten years many states 
have begun to enact statutes that protect domestic violence victims 
who hold private leases.268 When ratifying its own protective 
statute in 2004, the Washington state legislature publicly 
acknowledged the policy reasons for “facilitat[ing] escape options 
for domestic violence victims . . . [to] allow[] victims to terminate 
residential leases without penalty.”269 The state legislature 
recognized the public safety aspect at risk by explaining that it 
“[found] that victims of these crimes who do not have access to safe 
housing are more likely to remain in or return to abusive or 
dangerous situations . . . . The legislature further [found] that 
evidence that a prospective tenant has been a victim of domestic 
                                                                                                     
 263. Calicoat v. Calicoat, No. o8CA32, 2009 WL 3683665, at *12 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Nov. 6, 2009) (quoting State v. Martin, 151 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio 1958)). 
 264. Id. 
 265. See id (explaining that state legislatures are granted the power to protect 
their citizens general welfare).   
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1876 (noting then that “Oregon, 
Washington, Colorado, North Carolina, and Texas have laws that allow domestic 
violence victims to terminate a rental agreement without financial penalty,” but 
now many more states do). 
 269. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Serv., Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 133 (Wash. 2008). 
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violence . . . is not relevant to the decision whether to rent to that 
prospective tenant.”270 While this acknowledgment is a step in the 
right direction compared to when the only protective statute was 
VAWA and when only a few states had protective statutes, still not 
all states have statutes.271 The statutes that do exist are 
inconsistent when juxtaposed, therefore they confuse judges and 
victims who reside in multiple states.272 
B.  Existing State Statutes 
Thirty-one states have enacted statutes that allow domestic 
violence victims to terminate their private leases early in order to 
escape abusive situations.273 While most statutes have similar 
provisions, the failure of other states to include certain provisions 
limits the protections available to the victims in those states.274 For 
example, some state statutes, such as Nevada’s, include a specific 
definition of “domestic violence” in their lease termination 
provision, putting the term into context.275 Not all states—Arizona 
is one example—include definitions that relate specifically to lease 
terminations, thereby creating ambiguity and confusion.276 Some 
states, including Texas, have promulgated highly detailed 
provisions that cover protections for victims, landlords, and 
members of the public who might be involved, such as other 
tenants in the building or complex.277 This last group of statutes 
                                                                                                     
 270. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws 45.  
 271. See State Laws, supra note 25.  
 272. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (exemplifying 
one state statute with protective provisions that are not reflected in all state 
statutes, but also fails to include protective measures that other statutes have). 
 273. See State Laws, supra note 25 (listing which states have protective 
statutes).  
 274. See State Laws, supra note 25 (detailing the similarities and differences 
of state statutes). 
 275. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing definitions 
of certain terms that appear in the statute as they relate to the statute). 
 276. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1318 (2018) (failing to include definitions 
of terms as they relate specifically to the statute). 
 277. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010) (including provisions 
that allow landlord to evict or collect from tenants if necessary and unrelated to 
the tenant’s status as a victim, while also protecting victims and others who live 
in the same apartment complex). 
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provides the most clarity for judges and allows a decision that is 
more acceptable to all of the involved parties.278 For instance, 
several provisions address the question of whether the tenant or 
the landlord retains the security deposit when the lease is 
terminated.279 Courts have been inconsistent in their 
determination of who gets the deposit, but some statutes, such as 
North Dakota’s, provide clarification of who should receive it in 
certain circumstances.280 
The Washington state statute includes an actual template of 
a letter that a tenant can send to the landlord explaining that the 
tenant is a victim of domestic violence and would like to terminate 
the lease early.281 In this uncommon approach, a victim can simply 
fill out the form with his or her name and information.282 Because 
it is included in the state statute, a court would have to accept such 
a letter as valid.283 The form letter helps victims because it is a 
quick and easy way to inform their landlords of their desire to 
terminate their lease.284 Many tenants would have difficulty 
preparing an acceptable letter themselves.285 
                                                                                                     
 278. See Johnson, supra note 70 (providing how state statutes help judges 
understand how to properly adjudicate cases). 
 279. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (addressing how 
different situations can lead to either the landlord or the tenant receiving the 
security deposit after the lease is terminated early);  see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) (addressing different landlord and tenant 
contractual situations). 
 280. See § 47-16-17.1 (clarifying when a tenant versus a landlord gets to keep 
the security deposit);  see also § 38-12-402 (stating when a tenant, not the 
landlord, keeps the security deposit);  Turner v. 1212 S. Mich. P’ship, 355 Ill. App. 
3d 885, 887 (2005) (addressing the question directly of who should get the security 
deposit in certain situations, as different ordinances confuse the question in 
court). 
 281. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (providing a template 
of a form a tenant can share with his or her landlord to terminate a lease early). 
 282. See id. (detailing what information should be included in the letter). 
 283. See id. (including areas where the drafter can fill in the blank as well as 
describing what the drafter should write so that a landlord must accept it and 
terminate a lease). 
 284. See id. (describing the rationale behind providing a template of a form 
letter).  
 285. See id. (explaining what information is necessary, such as what the 
incident was, who the parties were, and when the incident occurred). 
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In contrast, some statutes are far too narrow and fail to 
include protections that most other statutes provide.286 For 
example, the New Jersey statute is unique in its brevity at one 
page long.287 It also fails to include protections for victims who have 
temporary, thirty-day protective orders.288 Other statutes protect 
victims with temporary protective orders, which is important 
because many more women seek temporary orders than 
permanent ones, especially if they have children with the 
abuser.289 
C.  What If a State Lacks a Protective Statute? 
Thirteen states lack protective statutes all together, including 
Montana, Idaho, Kansas, and Mississippi.290 Without any 
statutory directive or guidance, courts can rule as they see fit, 
sometimes leaving a victim in a dangerous situation.291 For 
example, in 2008 a domestic violence victim in Ohio brought suit 
against her landlord for refusing to simply move her to another 
unit in the same apartment complex so that her abuser would not 
know where she lived.292 Ohio does not have a protective statute at 
all so the decision was left up to the judge.293 
                                                                                                     
 286. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-9.6 (West 2008) (failing to include a template, 
discussion about security deposits, or protections for tenants with ex parte 
orders). 
 287. See id. (exemplifying a statute that is only a page long). 
 288. See id. (providing only a minimally protective provision). 
 289. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how many 
women who are granted temporary protective orders do not follow through with 
training to be granted a permanent protective order because of time, effort, and 
fear). 
 290. See State Laws, supra note 25 (detailing which states do not have 
protective statutes). 
 291. See Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 1:08-CV-238, 2008 
WL 1924255, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008) (reflecting on the effects of a state 
lacking a protective statute). 
 292. See id. at *1 (“As a result of the abuse and the threat to her life, Plaintiff 
has requested that the CMHA transfer her to another unit or scattered site 
dwelling so that Mr. Davis will not be able to find her and will not be able to 
continue to be a threat to her well being.”). 
 293. See id. at *7 (reflecting an adjudicated case not reliant on an available 
statute). 
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In that case, Yolanda Robinson lived in an apartment with her 
two children, but chose to leave when her then-boyfriend began 
abusing her.294 Robinson’s ex-boyfriend began to abuse her a few 
months after they started dating.295 Ultimately, Robinson’s 
ex-boyfriend forced his way into her apartment and beat her, 
causing significant physical damage to her body and the home.296 
He fled the scene after threatening to come back and kill her, which 
is why she and her children were afraid to stay there.297 After the 
incident, Robinson filed a police report and was granted an 
emergency ex parte temporary protective order.298 She also asked 
her landlord to transfer her and her children to another available 
unit so that they could escape the abuse and hide from the 
perpetrator.299 The landlord refused and claimed that transfers for 
this reason were not in their policy.300 The court ruled in favor of 
the landlord for several reasons that violate VAWA, other state 
statutes, and public policy.301 The court determined that the 
landlord had not wronged Robinson because she was not evicted.302 
“Although the Plaintiff has good reason to seek shelter, the fact is 
that the Plaintiff is choosing not to return to her home for reasons 
                                                                                                     
 294. See id. at *1 (“Until recently, she lived at the same location with her two 
children. She still pays rent and utilities for this unit. However, she has not lived 
there since January 14, 2008, because at that time she was subjected to 
significant and traumatic abuse by her former boyfriend.”). 
 295. See id. (articulating Mr. Davis’ abuse). 
 296. See id. (“Mr. Davis came to Plaintiff’s home, forced his way in and 
severely beat her. This attack caused significant injuries to Plaintiff and also 
caused property damage to the home.”). 
 297. See id. (“Since that time, Plaintiff and her children have been living with 
friends and family. Plaintiff and her children are afraid to return to the residence 
because Mr. Davis has threatened to come back and kill Plaintiff.”). 
 298. See id. (“Ms. Robinson, the Plaintiff, has filed a police report and was 
granted an ex parte Civil Stalking and Sexually Oriented Offense Protection 
Order.”). 
 299. See id. (“As a result of the abuse and the threat to her life, Plaintiff has 
requested that the CMHA transfer her to another unit or scattered site dwelling 
so that Mr. Davis will not be able to find her and will not be able to continue to be 
a threat .  .  . .”). 
 300. See id. (“CMHA has declined to transfer Plaintiff because its policy does 
not provide for transfers on the basis that a tenant has been a victim of domestic 
violence.”). 
 301. Id.  
 302. See id. (“CMHA has not taken any steps to evict Plaintiff from her home 
or otherwise affect her federal housing subsidy. Her unit is still her unit.”). 
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unrelated to the services provided to her by the [Metro Housing 
Authority].”303 The court also noted that the landlord did not cause 
the domestic violence and therefore should not have to move her.304 
Robinson and her two children had to rely on friends and family to 
stay with while still paying rent at an apartment they could not 
live in because their lives were in danger.305 
The court’s holding ultimately disregards human dignity by 
determining that if a landlord does not have a specific policy that 
allows a tenant to be moved if she is a domestic violence victim, 
then the victim has no hope of transfer and safety.306 It is equitable, 
though, that a landlord can transfer a victim to another unit if one 
is available in the absence of a specific policy encouraging 
transfer.307 Robinson was left paying rent for an apartment she 
could not safely reside in while, alternatively, the landlord could 
likely have moved Robinson to another similar unit and still 
receive a rent check, all while supporting the tenant’s needs.308 
“Plaintiff claims that the harm she has or may suffer far outweighs 
any harm that may be suffered by the CMHA or any other party. 
She claims that she is homeless and will remain homeless unless 
she is granted a transfer.”309 The judge felt as though affording 
Robinson this protection was a job for law enforcement and not one 
with which the landlord had to concern himself.310 The court ruled 
that “[i]t is not the responsibility of the housing authority to 
protect its tenants from all potential crime, including domestic 
                                                                                                     
 303. Id. at *5. 
 304. See id. at *4 (“When compared with domestic violence, the initial 
placement of the tenant is not a causative factor of the domestic violence.”). 
 305. See id. at *6 (“The Court is not insensitive to the Plaintiff’s situation and 
the turmoil she has faced due to the violent acts of Mr. Davis. . . . [H]owever, the 
status of the law does not require the CMHA to grant her a transfer on the basis 
of a threat of future domestic violence.”). 
 306. See id. (emphasizing the lack of policy, statute, or law requiring a victim 
to be transferred if she requires proper protocol). 
 307. See id. (concluding that the lack of a clear indication that the victim must 
be moved translates to her inability to be moved, failing to consider that the judge 
could ask the landlord to move the tenant for policy reasons, even though no 
statute requires the landlord move her). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at *5. 
 310. See id. (“To do so would essentially place CMHA in the role of law 
enforcement and make them a guarantor of their tenants’ safety.”). 
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violence.”311 The court determined that protecting Robinson would 
“be discouraging to private landlords who make their properties 
available” and therefore landlords should be able to deny a 
suffering tenant a safe place to live.312 
This case justifies the need for state protective statutes 
because some judges hold that, absent directly applicable statutory 
or regulatory language, they lack the authority to grant a victim 
protection regarding housing.313 In this case the court determined 
that “[u]nfortunately . . . the status of the law does not require the 
[landlord] to grant [Robinson] a transfer on the basis of a threat of 
future domestic violence.”314 All states must enact legislation to 
protect victims because without declarative law, victims are too 
easily ignored and their lives are often at risk if they are not 
granted the help they request.315 An easily adaptable model statute 
for states without such laws would generally simplify and speed up 
passage of legislation to ameliorate living circumstances for many 
domestic violence victims.316 
V. Proposed Model Universal Statute 
A universal statute for all states to adopt could resolve the 
ambiguities and gaps in protection that currently exist. VAWA is 
insufficient to protect all domestic violence victims’ housing 
concerns because it only applies to federally subsidized housing.317 
Victims with private leases are also still not adequately protected 
in many states.318 For example, Illinois courts have struggled to 
                                                                                                     
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at *6. 
 313. See id. (determining to not provide the victim with protection because 
the landlord had no policy to move domestic violence victims and Ohio does not 
have an applicable statute). 
 314. Id. 
 315. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 1860 (explaining the “necessity and 
legitimacy of state laws that provide domestic violence victims with the right to 
terminate a rental agreement without penalty in order to escape abuse.”). 
 316. See generally infra Appendix (outlining a model statute). 
 317. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 
113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013) (explaining what the act protects). 
 318. See Sara Olkon, Tenant Reported Abuse—Then Suffered Eviction, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 13, 2009, at A1 (“The federal [VAWA] of 2005 protects victims who live 
in public or subsidized housing from eviction because of . . . violence, experts say, 
WHERE IS HOME?  325 
award security deposits to domestic violence victims because the 
state lacks a provision clarifying whether the security deposit 
accrues to the tenant or landlord.319 Regarding the case of a 
Michigan woman who attempted to terminate her lease early for 
the purpose of escaping an abusive situation and wished to retain 
her security deposit, the court determined that “[a]lthough the 
Lease specifically provided for a ‘Termination Fee’ in the amount 
of $1,892.00 [ ], due to Mrs. Turner’s circumstances, I agreed to 
allowing Plaintiffs to prematurely terminate the Lease, in 
exchange for Plaintiffs’ agreement to forfeit their $1,046.00 
security deposit [ ], and any interest accrued thereon [ ].”320 There 
is inconsistency in court holdings because some states include 
security deposit provisions in their statutes and others do not.321 
This creates uncertainty regarding case law for victims and 
lawyers who are attempting to seek return of a security deposit.322 
Courts have complained about the lack of clarifying law.323 For 
example, in a case regarding a victim denied housing, the court felt 
as though it did not have enough guidance to adjudicate the case 
fairly.324 “Under these circumstances, pending further 
development of the legal and factual record, the court believes it is 
appropriate to decline to rule whether plaintiff has a right of 
action, enforceable under § 1983, pursuant to the provisions of 
VAWA as incorporated in the Housing Act of 1937.”325 The model 
                                                                                                     
but the law is hazier when it comes to private landlords. Advocates say a lack of 
clear protection creates a disincentive for . . . women to seek help.”). 
 319. See Turner v. 1212 S. Mich. P’ship, 355 Ill. App. 3d 885, 888 (2005) (“1212 
argued that it had agreed to permit Adriane Turner to terminate her lease early, 
but only on the condition that she forfeit her security deposit.”). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (addressing how 
different situations can lead to either the landlord or the tenant receiving the 
security deposit after the lease is terminated early);  see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) (same). 
 322. See § 38-12-402 (addressing how different situations can lead to either 
the landlord or the tenant receiving the security deposit after the lease is 
terminated early);  see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) 
(same). 
 323. See Meister v. Kansas City, No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *5 
(D. Kan. 2011) (addressing the lack of law in this area). 
 324. See id. (complaining of the lack of applicable law). 
 325. Id. 
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universal statute in the Appendix is designed to fill existing gaps 
in the law and render greater guidance to the courts.326 
A.  Elements of Model Universal Statute 
The model statute provides five key elements to help judges, 
victims, and landlords understand the law.327 The model statute 
incorporates different effective aspects of various state laws, such 
as Nevada’s definition section and Washington’s lease termination 
letter template, as well as originally developed provisions.328 
First, the model statute includes an extensive definition 
section.329 It articulates what certain terms mean when addressed 
within the context of the statute.330 Borrowing from Nevada’s early 
lease termination statute, terms such as “domestic violence” and 
“harassment” would have a specific meaning in the context of the 
statute and those lengthy definitions can be found in other sections 
of the model statute.331 The definition section adds clarity for the 
reader and resolves any ambiguity or potential for 
misunderstanding terminology.332 
Second, the statute clearly outlines how a domestic violence 
victim can terminate a lease.333 It explains what paperwork must 
be delivered to the landlord for him or her to grant an early lease 
termination, the proper method of delivery, and how the 
paperwork should be presented.334 Of note, adopted from the 
                                                                                                     
 326. See generally infra Appendix (outlining a model universal statute). 
 327. See generally infra Appendix (outlining a model universal statute). 
 328. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (incorporating term 
definitions);  see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (offering a 
template for letters tenants can send to their landlords). 
 329. See infra Appendix, ¶ 2 (providing definitions for terms used in the 
statute). 
 330. See infra Appendix, ¶ 2 (providing definitions for terms used in the 
statute). 
 331. See § 118A.345 (citing to different portions of the law to shorten the early 
lease termination statute). 
 332. See infra Appendix, ¶ 2 (defining eight terms used within the model 
universal statute). 
 333. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 1, 3, 4 (describing the procedure for terminating 
one’s lease).  
 334. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 3–4 (outling the proper paperwork and procedure 
for delivering the paperwork). 
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Washington statute, the model statute includes a template of a 
letter a victim can fill out to give to his or her landlord that clearly 
articulates the abuse with a sufficient amount of information for a 
judge to accept it.335 This information further reduces ambiguity 
and allows landlords to understand what information they need in 
order to grant the early termination of a lease.336 
Third, the model statute addresses the landlord’s role in the 
victim’s future ability to find housing. It details what the landlord 
can and cannot disclose to future landlords. It also forbids 
landlords from providing negative letters of reference for victims 
who needed to terminate their leases early for safety reasons. 
Landlords frequently discriminate against domestic violence 
victims because of their status as victims. Provisions of VAWA and 
this model statute would help to curtail that discrimination. 
Elements of these provisions were adopted from existing statutes, 
such as Colorado’s.337 
Fourth, the model statute addresses concerns about damages 
to the home and which party retains the security deposit after a 
lease is terminated early.338 Oftentimes judges are uncertain about 
which party should be awarded the security deposit.339 In many 
cases, the victim is left paying for damages he or she did not 
inflict.340 This statute clarifies under what circumstances the 
landlord receives the security deposit and when the tenant does. It 
also provides that the perpetrator of the abuse is liable for damages 
                                                                                                     
 335. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (including a letter 
template). 
 336. See infra Appendix, ¶ 3 (outlining a template letter). 
 337. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (including provisions 
protecting domestic violence victims from future landlord discrimination). 
 338. See infra Appendix, ¶ 6 (“If the tenant or cotenant has paid a security 
deposit, the deposit must not be withheld for the early termination of the rental 
agreement if the rental agreement is terminated pursuant to this section.”).  
 339. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-16-17.1 (West 2017) (stating that the 
security deposit must be paid to the lessee subject to some conditions);  see also 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (stating that the landlord is not 
obligated to refund the security deposit to the tenant unless certain conditions 
are met). 
 340. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., No. 1:08-CV-238, 
2008 WL 1924255, at *1, *2, *6 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2008) (denying Ms. Robinson’s 
motion to transfer and concluding Ms. Robinson was still liable for the apartment 
and any subsequent damage). 
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to the home when that person inflicted such damage.341 As noted 
in cases cited above, which party retains the security deposit is a 
common cause for concern.342 This model statute should provide 
clarity for judges, landlords, and tenants in the future when 
contemplating that question.343 Elements of the provision were 
adopted from the Kentucky statute.344 
Fifth, the model statute addresses privacy concerns.345 Under 
the statute, a landlord cannot disclose information about the 
victim to the perpetrator.346 It also allows the landlord or victim to 
change the locks on the home or to have the landlord transfer the 
tenant to a similar available unit.347 The victim’s safety is the 
primary concern.348 This statute includes various provisions 
adopted from state statutes, such as Washington’s, as well as 
original concepts like transferring tenant leases to other similar 
apartment units for the purpose of providing the victim with a 
different address, protecting the victim as fully as possible.349 
The model statute offers clarity and resolves ambiguities in 
existing laws.350 If adopted universally, all judges, tenants, and 
landlords would more easily understand their abilities and rights. 
                                                                                                     
 341. See infra Appendix, ¶ 7 (“A person who is named as the adverse party 
may be civilly liable for all economic losses incurred by the 
landlord . .  . including, . . . costs for repair for any damages . . . .”). 
 342. See Turner v. 1212 S. Mich. P’ship, 355 Ill. App. 3d 885, 887 (2005) 
(addressing the question directly of who should get the security deposit in certain 
situations). 
 343. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 6–7 (clarifying who receives the security deposit 
and who is liable for damages).  
 344. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.300 (West 2017) (addressing who gets the 
security deposit in different situations). 
 345. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 8–10 (codifying the landlord’s obligation to keep 
certain information confidential). 
 346. See infra Appendix, ¶ 8 (“A landlord shall not provide to an adverse party 
any information concerning the whereabouts of a tenant, cotenant or household 
member if the tenant or cotenant provided notice pursuant to subsection 1.”). 
 347. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 12–14 (delineating a landlord’s obligation to 
install new locks or transfer the tenant to another available unit). 
 348. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 12–14 (addressing that each of these remedies is 
to allow the victim to escape the domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault, 
or stalking). 
 349. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (including a lock-
change provision). 
 350. See generally infra Appendix (addressing ambiguities related to security 
deposits, damages, and how victims terminate their leases). 
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The statute includes protections for victims, landlords, and the 
public.351 Therefore, while landlords will likely claim that they will 
endure an undue burden of voiding contracts with tenants, that 
the statute is a slippery slope toward allowing non-victims to claim 
domestic violence as a means of excusing themselves from 
contractual obligation under a lease, and that they may bear 
undue expense as a result of an early lease termination, this 
statute resolves those concerns by including landlord 
protections.352 For example, the statute only requires landlords to 
transfer tenants within a building or complex if another 
comparable unit is available.353 It ensures the landlord does not 
have to make extra efforts to transfer a victim or lose a higher rent 
for a more expensive unit.354 The statute also requires that tenants 
provide supportive evidence of abuse, including protective orders 
and police reports.355 Therefore, not just anyone can claim abuse to 
terminate a lease early.356 Finally, the statute includes provisions 
explaining when tenants have to pay landlords, when an adverse 
party has to pay, and when the landlord is not liable, providing 
confirmation that the landlord will not be harmed. 
VI. Conclusion 
Public policy supports protecting women and men from 
domestic violence.357 Our society and government have taken steps 
                                                                                                     
351.  See generally infra Appendix (delineating a statute that considers the 
interests of the victims, the landlords, and the public). 
 352. See H.R. Rep. No. 2EHB-1645, at 4 (Wash. 2004) (articulating landlord 
qualms with early termination statutes). 
 353. See infra Appendix, ¶ 14 (“A landlord must agree to transfer a tenant to 
another available unit in the complex if an apartment of the same rental price is 
available . .  . .”). 
 354. See infra Appendix, ¶ 14 (requiring a landlord to transfer a tenant only 
if there is another available unit of the same rental price in the apartment 
complex). 
 355. See infra Appendix, ¶ 3 (mandating that the tenant provide the landlord 
with a copy of an order for protection, a written report from a law enforcement 
agency, or a written affidavit). 
 356. See infra Appendix, ¶ 3 (outlining the additional documents required for 
a tenant to terminate their lease). 
 357. See infra Appendix, ¶¶ 6, 7, 12, 17, 19 (explaining who is monetarily 
responsible in certain situations). 
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to protect victims and stop future violence by highlighting the 
prominence and lasting dangers of domestic violence.358 VAWA 
and protective state statutes are representations of the policy to 
protect victims via housing law efforts.359 “Domestic violence 
embodies an affront to victims’ human dignity . . . . In granting 
victims a right to early termination, the law places victims’ human 
dignity and what would otherwise constitute social inequality 
above landlords’ economic interests.”360 VAWA and the statutes 
that exist now are not enough to support this public-policy effort 
and adequately protect domestic violence victims’ housing 
concerns.361 A universal statute would likely be able to provide 
general coverage to victims and resolve ambiguity regarding what 
protections exist.362 
Had a universal state statute existed, Caren Burnett would 
have been able to more easily escape her husband’s abuse, not be 
discriminated against when looking for future housing, and not be 
financially burdened by losing a security deposit.363 Mrs. Burnett’s 
experience is far too common, as thousands of women attempt to 
escape situations of domestic violence daily.364 Thankfully, as the 
years progress, more states are enacting protective statutes and 
even some cities are enacting ordinances that allow domestic 
                                                                                                     
 358. See HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 173 (articulating efforts to combat 
domestic violence). 
 359. See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (serving as the primary federal law protecting female victims of 
domestic violence);  see also, e.g.,  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) 
(explaining the housing protection for domestic violence victims in Colorado). 
 360. Johnson, supra note 70, at 1875. 
 361. See Johnson, supra note 70 (addressing how more statutes are needed to 
protect victims). 
 362. See infra Appendix (addressing many of the inconsistencies and gaps in 
existing statutes). 
 363. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
15, 2012) (detailing the difficulties Mrs. Burnett faced when trying to leave her 
husband). 
 364. See Interview with Joel Correa, supra note 52 (explaining how on 
average approximately ten men and women, many with their children, come into 
the office daily to seek a protective order and escape from their abuser);  see also 
Joel L. Young, 5 Facts Everyone Must Know About Domestic Violence, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/when-your-
adult-child-breaks-your-heart/201510/5-facts-everyone-must-know-about-
domestic (last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“More than 200,000 phone calls are placed 
to domestic violence hotlines every year.”) [https://perma.cc/4NZF-29PB]. 
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violence victims to terminate their leases early.365 While steps are 
being taken to protect victims regarding their leases, the proposed 
model statute could provide protection for virtually all victims 
while resolving the challenge to courts, tenants, and landlords of 
understanding the law.366 Ultimately, Mrs. Burnett and all victims 
like her are in desperate need of a protective change¾their lives 
depend on it.367 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                     
 365. See Bill Turque, New KC Ordinance Lets Domestic Violence, Sexual 
Assault Victims Break Leases, KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 2, 2018, 4:36 PM) 
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article215974365.html 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2019) (“Victims of domestic violence, sexual assault or 
stalking will be able to terminate a lease without penalties from a landlord, under 
an ordinance passed Thursday by the Kansas City Council.”) 
[https://perma.cc/3CE8-L2H5]. 
 366. See infra Appendix (providing actions for victims and landlords to take 
to remedy particular scenarios and addressing inconsistencies within the law).   
 367. See Burnett v. Burnett, No. S-10-050, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 
15, 2012) (explaining the harmful emotional abuse Mrs. Burnett suffered).  
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Appendix 
1. If a tenant, cotenant, or household member is the victim of 
domestic violence, harassment, sexual assault, or stalking, the 
tenant or any cotenant may terminate the rental agreement by 
giving the landlord written notice of termination effective at 
the end of the current rental period or 30 days after the notice 
is provided to the landlord, whichever occurs sooner.368 
2. As used in this section: 
(a) “Adverse party” means a person who is named in an order 
for protection against domestic violence, harassment, sexual 
assault, or stalking, a written report from a law enforcement 
agency, or a written statement from a qualified third party and 
who is alleged to be the cause of the early termination of a 
rental agreement pursuant to this section. 
(b) “Cotenant” means a tenant who, pursuant to a rental 
agreement, is entitled to occupy a dwelling that another tenant 
is also entitled to occupy pursuant to the same rental 
agreement. 
(c) “Domestic violence” means the commission of any act 
described in _______ portion of the statute.369 
(d) “Harassment” means a violation of ____________________.370 
(e) “Household member” means any person who is related by 
blood or marriage and is actually residing with a tenant or 
cotenant. 
(f) “Qualified third party” means: 
(1) A physician licensed to practice in this State; 
(2) A psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine in this State 
and certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and 
Neurology, Inc. or the American Osteopathic Board of 
Neurology and Psychiatry of the American Osteopathic 
Association; 
(3) A psychologist licensed to practice in this State; 
(4) A social worker licensed to practice in this State; 
                                                                                                     
 368. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample text 
to be used for a statute). 
 369. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.485 (West 2018) (providing a sample 
definition of “domestic violence”). 
 370. See id. § 200.571 (providing a sample definition of “harassment”). 
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(5) A registered nurse holding a master’s degree in the field 
of psychiatric nursing and licensed to practice professional 
nursing in this State; 
(6) A marriage and family therapist or clinical professional 
counselor licensed to practice in this State; 
(7) Any person who: 
(I) Is employed by an agency or service which advises 
persons regarding domestic violence or refers them to 
persons or agencies where their request and needs 
can be met and who is licensed to provide health care, 
or is a member of the board of directors or serves as 
the executive director of an agency or service which 
advises persons regarding domestic violence or refers 
them to persons or agencies where their request and 
needs can be met; 
(II) Has received training relating to domestic 
violence; and 
(III) Is a resident of this State; or 
(8) Any member of the clergy of a church or religious society 
or denomination that is recognized as exempt under section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 
501 (c)(3), who has been chosen, elected or appointed in 
conformity with the constitution, canons, rites, regulations 
or discipline of the church or religious society or 
denomination and who is a resident of this State. 
(g) “Sexual assault” means a violation of _________________.371 
(h) “Stalking” means a violation of ______________________.372 
3. In the case of a termination of a rental agreement pursuant to 
this section on the grounds that a tenant, cotenant, or 
household member is a victim of domestic violence, the written 
notice provided to a landlord pursuant to subsection 1 must be 
delivered by mail, email, or in person and must describe the 
reason for the termination of the rental agreement and be 
accompanied by: 
(a) A copy of an order for protection, either temporary or 
permanent, against domestic violence issued to the tenant, 
                                                                                                     
 371. See id. § 200.366 (providing a sample definition of “sexual assault”). 
 372. See id. § 200.575 (providing a sample definition of “stalking”). 
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cotenant, or household member who is the victim of domestic 
violence; 
(b) A copy of a written report from a law enforcement agency 
indicating that the tenant, cotenant, or household member 
notified the law enforcement agency of the domestic violence;  
or 
(c) A copy of a written affidavit in the form prescribed below and 
signed by a qualified third party acting in his or her official 
capacity stating that the tenant, cotenant, or household member is 
a victim of domestic violence and identifying the adverse party. 
(I) The record of the report to a qualified third party may be 
accomplished by completion of a form provided by the qualified 
third party, in substantially the following form: 
 ________________________________________  
Name of organization, agency, clinic, professional service 
provider 
I and/or my [household member] am/is a victim of 
__ domestic violence as defined above. 
__ sexual assault as defined above. 
__ stalking as defined above. 
__ unlawful harassment as defined above. 
Briefly describe the incident of domestic violence, sexual 
assault, unlawful harassment, or stalking: 
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
The incident(s) that I rely on in support of this declaration 
occurred on the following date(s) and time(s) and at the 
following location(s):  
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
 
The incident(s) that I rely on in support of this declaration 
were committed by the following person(s):  
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_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________ 
I state under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of 
[state name] that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated at 
[city], this ___ day of _______ 20___. 
________________________________________   
Signature of Tenant or Household Member 
I verify that I have provided to the person whose signature 
appears above the statutes and that the individual was a 
victim of an act that constitutes a crime of domestic violence, 
sexual assault, unlawful harassment, or stalking, and that the 
individual informed me of the name of the alleged perpetrator 
of the act. Dated this ___day of _______, 20___ 
________________________________________    
Signature of authorized officer/employee of (organization, 
agency, clinic, professional service provider.373 
4. In the case of a termination of a rental agreement pursuant to 
this section on the grounds that a tenant, cotenant, or 
household member is a victim of harassment, sexual assault, 
or stalking, the written notice provided to a landlord pursuant 
to subsection 1 must describe the reason for the termination of 
the rental agreement and be accompanied by: 
(a) A copy of a written report from a law enforcement agency 
indicating that the tenant, cotenant, or household member 
notified the law enforcement agency of the harassment, sexual 
assault, or stalking, as applicable;  or 
(b) A copy of a temporary or extended protective order, as 
applicable.374 
5. A tenant or cotenant may terminate a rental agreement 
pursuant to this section only if the actions, events, or 
circumstances that resulted in the tenant, cotenant, or 
household member becoming a victim of domestic violence, 
harassment, sexual assault, or stalking occurred within the 90 
                                                                                                     
 373. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (West 2009) (providing a sample 
form). 
 374. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample 
text). 
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days immediately preceding the written notice of termination 
to the landlord.375 
6. A tenant or cotenant who terminates a rental agreement 
pursuant to this section is only liable, if solely or jointly liable 
for purposes of the rental agreement, for any rent owed or 
required to be paid through the date of termination and any 
other outstanding obligations. If the tenant or cotenant has 
prepaid rent that would apply for the rental period in which the 
rental agreement is terminated, the landlord may retain the 
prepaid rent and no refund is due to the tenant or cotenant 
unless the amount of the prepaid rent exceeds what is owed for 
that rental period. If the tenant or cotenant has paid a security 
deposit, the deposit must not be withheld for the early 
termination of the rental agreement if the rental agreement is 
terminated pursuant to this section.376 
7. (a) A person who is named as the adverse party may be civilly 
liable for all economic losses incurred by a landlord for the early 
termination of a rental agreement pursuant to this section, 
including, without limitation, unpaid rent, fees relating to 
early termination, costs for the repair of any damages to the 
dwelling, and any reductions in or waivers of rent previously 
extended to the tenant or cotenant who terminates the rental 
agreement pursuant to this section. 
(b) The tenant must not be liable for the adverse party’s crimes 
or property damage.377  
8. A landlord shall not provide to an adverse party any 
information concerning the whereabouts of a tenant, cotenant, 
or household member if the tenant or cotenant provided notice 
pursuant to subsection 1.378 
9. If a tenant to a residential rental agreement or lease agreement 
notifies the landlord that the tenant is a victim of unlawful 
sexual behavior, stalking, domestic violence, or domestic abuse, 
the landlord shall not disclose such fact to any person except 
with the consent of the victim or as the landlord may be 
required to do so by law.379 
                                                                                                     
 375. See id. (providing sample text). 
 376. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.300 (West 2017) (providing sample text). 
 377. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample 
text). 
 378. See id. (providing sample text). 
 379. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-402 (West 2017) (providing sample 
text). 
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10. If a tenant to a residential rental agreement or lease agreement 
terminates his or her lease pursuant to this section because he 
or she is a victim of unlawful sexual behavior, stalking, 
domestic violence, or domestic abuse, and the tenant provides 
the landlord with a new address, the landlord shall not disclose 
such address to any person except with the consent of the 
victim or as the landlord may be required to do so by law.380 
11. A person may not refuse to rent, refuse to negotiate for the 
rental of, or in any other manner make unavailable or deny a 
dwelling to an individual, or otherwise retaliate or discriminate 
in the rental of a dwelling solely because a tenant or applicant 
or a household member of the tenant or applicant exercised the 
right to terminate a lease under this section.381 
12. If a tenant or cotenant provided notice pursuant to subsection 
1, the tenant, the cotenant, or a household member may require 
the landlord to install a new lock onto the dwelling if the 
tenant, cotenant, or household member pays the cost of 
installing the new lock. A landlord complies with the 
requirements of this subsection by: 
(a) Rekeying the lock if the lock is in good working condition;  
or 
(b) Replacing the entire locking mechanism with a new locking 
mechanism of equal or superior quality.382 
13. A landlord who installs a new lock pursuant to subsection 8 
may retain a copy of the new key. Notwithstanding any 
provision in a rental agreement to the contrary, the landlord 
shall: 
(a) Refuse to provide a key which unlocks the new lock to an 
adverse party. 
(b) Refuse to provide to an adverse party, whether or not that 
party is a tenant, cotenant, or household member, access to the 
dwelling to reclaim property unless a law enforcement officer 
is present.383 
14. A landlord must agree to transfer a tenant to another available 
unit in the complex if a unit of the same rental price is 
available, merely transferring the existing lease to another 
                                                                                                     
 380. Id. 
 381. See GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-23 (2018) (providing sample text). 
 382. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.345 (West 2017) (providing sample 
text). 
 383. See id. (providing sample text). 
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similar unit for the purpose of escaping domestic violence, 
harassment, sexual assault, or stalking. 
15. This section shall not be construed to limit a landlord’s right to 
terminate a rental agreement for reasons unrelated to domestic 
violence, harassment, sexual assault, or stalking.384 
16. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the termination of 
a rental agreement pursuant to this section: 
(a) Must not be disclosed, described, or characterized as an 
early termination by a current landlord to a prospective 
landlord;  and 
(b) Is not required to be disclosed as an early termination by a 
tenant or cotenant to a prospective landlord.385 
17. If a tenant does not vacate the leased premises within 30 days 
of providing to the landlord the written notice required, the 
landlord is entitled to rent from the tenant and can terminate 
the lease after 60 days.386  
18. A landlord is immune from civil liability if the landlord in good 
faith acts in accordance with this section.387  
19. A landlord who violates this section not in good fail is liable to 
the tenant for actual damages, civil penalty equal in amount to 
the amount of one month’s rent plus $500, and attorney’s 
fees.388  
20. A tenant’s right to terminate a lease before the end of the lease 
term, vacate the dwelling, and avoid liability under this section 
may not be waived by a tenant. 389 
                                                                                                     
 384. Id. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010) (providing sample text).  
 387. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.300 (West 2017) (providing sample text). 
 388. PROP. § 92.016.  
 389. Id.  
